Over the past two decades, modal epistemology has turned its attention to ordinary modal knowledge. This paper brings to the fore a neglected but central form of ordinary modal knowledge: knowledge of agentive modality, and in particular of our own abilities, which I call ‘ability knowledge’. I argue that modal epistemology as it is does not account for ability knowledge, by looking at the most promising candidate theories: perception-based, counterfactual-based, and similarity-based modal epistemologies. I then outline a more promising epistemology for our ability knowledge, which relies on the experience of our own agency, and draw out some lessons for modal epistemology in general.

中文翻译：

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能力与普通情态的认识论


过去二十年来，模态认识论已将注意力转向普通模态知识。本文提出了普通模态知识的一种被忽视但核心的形式：主体模态的知识，特别是我们自己的能力，我称之为“能力知识”。我认为，通过研究最有前途的候选理论：基于感知的、基于反事实的和基于相似性的模态认识论，模态认识论本身并不能解释能力知识。然后，我为我们的能力知识概述了一种更有前途的认识论，它依赖于我们自己机构的经验，并为一般的模态认识论吸取了一些经验教训。