Good‐for theorists claim that to be valuable is to be good for someone, in the sense of being beneficial for them. Their opponents deny this, arguing that some things are good‐simpliciter: good independently of being good for anyone. In this article I argue in favor of good‐simpliciter. I appeal to the category of symbolically valuable acts, acts which seem valuable even when they do not benefit anyone and even when they are costly to the agent. I explore various strategies a good‐for theorist might pursue to address these apparently valuable acts, for example by appealing to the acts’ connection to beneficial character traits or practices, and I argue that none of these strategies succeed. Instead, I propose that the best way to understand the value of these acts involves seeing them as appropriate responses to what is good‐simpliciter, and more specifically, as ways of loving what is worthy of love.

中文翻译：

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象征价值和有益理论的局限性


有益理论家声称，有价值就是对某人有益，即对他们有利。他们的反对者否认这一点，认为有些事情是好的——更简单：好的独立于对任何人都有好处。在这篇文章中，我支持良好的简化。我呼吁具有象征意义的有价值的行为，即使这些行为对任何人都没有好处，甚至对代理人来说代价高昂，但这些行为似乎仍然有价值。我探索了利益理论家可能采取的各种策略来解决这些明显有价值的行为，例如通过诉诸这些行为与有益的性格特征或实践的联系，但我认为这些策略都没有成功。相反，我建议理解这些行为的价值的最佳方式是将它们视为对美好事物的适当反应——更简单，更具体地说，将它们视为爱值得爱的事物的方式。