Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional‐attitude content. We articulate a framework to characterize and evaluate this disagreement. The framework involves two claims: i) that we should individuate attitude content in whatever way fits best with the explanations that characteristically appeal to it, and ii) that we can understand those explanations by analogy with other ‘higher‐level’ explanations. Using the framework, we argue for an under‐appreciated form of Russellianism. Along the way we demonstrate that being more explicit about the framework in which debates about attitude content take place allows us to more precisely characterize the space of possible positions and the dialectic between them.

中文翻译：

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弗雷格案例和合理化解释


罗素主义者、关系主义者和弗雷格主义者对于命题态度内容的本质存在分歧。我们阐明了一个框架来描述和评估这种分歧。该框架涉及两个主张：i）我们应该以最适合其特征的解释的方式将态度内容个性​​化，ii）我们可以通过与其他“更高层次”的解释进行类比来理解这些解释。利用这个框架，我们主张一种未被充分重视的罗素主义形式。在此过程中，我们证明，更明确地了解有关态度内容的辩论的框架，使我们能够更准确地描述可能立场的空间以及它们之间的辩证关系。