Decentralized governance technologies like blockchains are often proposed as substitutes for private legal arrangements like those provided by company law or organizational law more generally. In established legal systems in developed countries, the costs of implementing such algorithmic mechanisms are likely to be greater than the agency or other costs that come from selecting and trusting an existing third party. But even if that were not true, attempting to achieve decentralized governance solely by algorithm is more complicated than it appears and incurs significant “formalism costs.” Such costs can be reduced by the wealth of experience represented by the operational processes of organizational law. Mixing those operational processes with algorithmic governance by “opting into” organizational law, thereby letting it govern the interface between the algorithms and the real‐world legal rights associated with an organization, is likely to be a governance model superior to the use of algorithmic governance alone.

中文翻译：

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信任组织法


像区块链这样的去中心化治理技术通常被提议作为私人法律安排的替代品，例如更广泛的公司法或组织法提供的法律安排。在发达国家已建立的法律体系中，实施此类算法机制的成本可能高于选择和信任现有第三方所产生的代理成本或其他成本。但即使事实并非如此，试图仅通过算法实现去中心化治理也比看上去更加复杂，并且会产生巨大的“形式主义成本”。这种成本可以通过组织法运作流程所代表的丰富经验来降低。通过“选择”组织法，将这些运营流程与算法治理相结合，从而让它来管理界面算法与与组织相关的现实世界合法权利之间的平衡可能是一种优于单独使用算法治理的治理模型。