ABSTRACT Under the Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) model, banks should fully recognize expected lifetime credit losses upon loan origination while gradually recognizing interest revenues. This timelier recognition of losses versus gains (i.e., conditional conservatism) makes banks more capital constrained. To mitigate this, banks may (1) offset timelier credit losses by lowering conservatism in other earnings components and (2) reduce credit losses by demanding greater borrower conservatism. We find that, under CECL, banks increase conservatism in loan losses but decrease conservatism in other earnings components, making overall conservatism only marginally increase. In sharp contrast, their borrowers increase conservatism by 40 percent, and borrowers’ increase is twice that of banks. This substantial spillover effect suggests that, by greatly increasing borrowers’ conservatism, CECL may strengthen debt governance of a broad scope of firms in the economy, thereby having economy-wide consequences beyond the banking industry and potentially enhancing the stability of the entire economy. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the study. JEL Classifications: G21; M41; M48.

中文翻译：

---

当前预期信用损失模型对银行条件稳健性的影响及其对借款人稳健性的溢出效应


摘要在当前预期信用损失（CECL）模型下，银行应在贷款发放时充分确认预期终身信用损失，同时逐步确认利息收入。这种对损失与收益的及时确认（即有条件的保守主义）使银行的资本更加紧张。为了缓解这种情况，银行可以（1）通过降低其他收益组成部分的保守性来抵消及时的信贷损失，以及（2）通过要求借款人采取更大的保守性来减少信贷损失。我们发现，在CECL下，银行增加了贷款损失的保守性，但降低了其他盈利组成部分的保守性，使得整体保守性仅小幅增加。与此形成鲜明对比的是，他们的借款人保守程度提高了40%，而借款人的增幅是银行的两倍。这种巨大的溢出效应表明，通过大大提高借款人的保守性，CECL可以加强经济中众多企业的债务治理，从而对银行业以外的整个经济产生影响，并有可能增强整个经济的稳定性。数据可用性：数据可从研究中确定的来源公开获得。 JEL 分类：G21； M41； M48。