ABSTRACT We estimate the pay premium associated with CEO incentive compensation. Using explicit detailed U.S. CEO compensation contract data and simulation analysis, we find that CEOs with riskier pay packages receive a premium for pay at risk that represents 13.5 percent of total pay. The premium is positively correlated with proxies for CEO risk aversion, but implied risk aversion values suggest that the premium is economically smaller than suggested by prior studies. We perform our tests using a variety of proxies to measure the variance of pay and find consistent evidence of economically small pay risk premiums. These results are consistent with recent findings suggesting that risk may have a more limited influence over the level of pay than previously thought. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D81; G30; J33.

中文翻译：

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高管激励薪酬的溢价有多大？


摘要我们估算了与首席执行官激励薪酬相关的薪酬溢价。通过使用明确详细的美国 CEO 薪酬合同数据和模拟分析，我们发现薪酬风险较高的 CEO 获得的风险薪酬溢价占总薪酬的 13.5%。溢价与 CEO 风险厌恶程度呈正相关，但隐含的风险厌恶值表明，溢价在经济上比之前的研究建议的要小。我们使用各种代理来衡量薪酬差异，并找到经济上较小的薪酬风险溢价的一致证据。这些结果与最近的研究结果一致，表明风险对薪酬水平的影响可能比之前想象的更为有限。数据可用性：数据可从文中引用的公共来源获得。 JEL 分类：D81； G30； J33。