ABSTRACT This paper presents a unifying model of disclosure in the presence of competitors and supply market reliance to examine the role of multisegment operations on disclosure choice. A firm’s private information can have varying demand implications for its own portfolio of segments and for its competitors’ portfolios of segments. In multisegment firms, cross-firm spillovers of information discourage disclosure whereas cross-segment spillovers encourage disclosure. This suggests multisegment firms with more informationally diverse segments will have more incentives for transparency. Further, in multisegment firms, reliance on an imperfect supply market has less detrimental effects on transparency compared to single-segment firms. Supply market reliance is less detrimental for multisegment firms with a more diverse portfolio of segments. The results suggest that multisegment firms have more incentives for transparency relative to single-segment firms. JEL Classifications: L11; L13; M41.

中文翻译：

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多部门公司的战略披露激励措施


摘要本文提出了在存在竞争对手和供应市场依赖的情况下的统一披露模型，以研究多部门运营对披露选择的作用。公司的私人信息可能对其自己的细分市场组合及其竞争对手的细分市场组合产生不同的需求影响。在多部门的公司中，跨部门的信息溢出阻碍了披露，而跨部门的溢出则鼓励了披露。这表明，拥有更多信息多样化部门的多部门公司将更有动力提高透明度。此外，与单部门公司相比，多部门公司对不完善的供应市场的依赖对透明度的不利影响较小。对于细分市场组合更加多样化的多细分市场公司来说，供应市场的依赖危害较小。结果表明，相对于单一细分市场的公司，多细分市场的公司对透明度有更多的激励。 JEL 分类：L11； L13； M41。