ABSTRACT Access to firms’ innovation outputs determines the extent of knowledge spillover that poses risk to innovation appropriability. We provide plausibly causal evidence that processing costs of financial disclosures, which inform users of the economic value of innovation, play a key role in firms’ management of knowledge spillover. We exploit an exogenous, randomly assigned, and staggered policy shock by the SEC that reduces processing costs of mandatory financial disclosures. In response, firms reduce patenting rates, with the effect concentrated among firms in more competitive industries and with lower costs of capital. Firms also reduce their patent disclosure quality. Our results suggest firms rely more on trade secrecy as their innovation property protection mechanism. Lower processing costs of financial disclosures affect neither innovation inputs nor voluntary disclosure practices. Our results show that firms strategically manage access to their innovation outputs through financial disclosures, patent disclosures, and trade secrecy to curb knowledge spillover. JEL Classifications: D23; G30; O31; O32; O34.

中文翻译：

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获取财务披露和知识溢出


摘要获得企业创新成果的机会决定了知识溢出的程度，而知识溢出对创新专有性构成了风险。我们提供了看似合理的因果证据，表明财务披露的处理成本（告知用户创新的经济价值）在企业知识溢出管理中发挥着关键作用。我们利用 SEC 的外生、随机分配和交错政策冲击来降低强制财务披露的处理成本。作为回应，企业降低了专利申请率，其影响集中在竞争更激烈、资本成本更低的行业中。公司还降低了专利披露质量。我们的结果表明，企业更多地依赖商业秘密作为其创新财产保护机制。财务披露处理成本的降低既不会影响创新投入，也不会影响自愿披露实践。我们的研究结果表明，企业通过财务披露、专利披露和商业秘密来战略性地管理对其创新成果的获取，以遏制知识溢出。 JEL 分类：D23； G30； O31； O32； O34。