ABSTRACT We study how proprietary information flows in strategic alliances facilitate banks’ information collection in private debt markets. We argue that lenders that have previously worked with a borrower’s alliance partners have an information advantage and show that firms entering a strategic alliance receive a lower interest spread on loans from banks that have previously lent to their strategic partners than loans from other banks. Cross-sectional tests on alliances’ economic importance and participants’ information environment support our hypothesis that the loan price effect is driven by reduced information asymmetry between borrowers and their partners’ relationship banks. Last, we find borrowers are more likely to obtain debt financing from alliance-related banks than from other banks. Overall, our findings are consistent with lenders that have previously worked with an alliance counterparty possessing debt contracting-relevant information about the soft nature of alliance value and the partners’ commitment to alliances. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G10; G21; G32.

中文翻译：

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战略联盟和借贷关系


摘要我们研究战略联盟中的专有信息流动如何促进银行在私人债务市场上的信息收集。我们认为，以前与借款人的联盟伙伴合作过的贷方具有信息优势，并且表明，进入战略联盟的公司从以前向其战略伙伴提供贷款的银行获得的贷款利差比从其他银行获得的贷款要低。对联盟经济重要性和参与者信息环境的横断面测试支持了我们的假设，即贷款价格效应是由借款人及其合作伙伴关系银行之间信息不对称的减少所驱动的。最后，我们发现借款人更有可能从联盟相关银行获得债务融资，而不是从其他银行获得债务融资。总体而言，我们的研究结果与之前与联盟对手方合作的贷款人是一致的，这些对手方拥有与联盟价值的软性质和合作伙伴对联盟的承诺有关的债务合同相关信息。数据可用性：数据可从文中引用的公共来源获得。 JEL 分类：G10； G21； G32。