ABSTRACT We study the real effects on innovation of a transformative change in corporate disclosure dissemination, the implementation of the SEC’s EDGAR system. On the one hand, increased disclosure dissemination can lower firms’ cost of capital, thereby stimulating innovative activity. On the other hand, increased dissemination can exacerbate proprietary disclosure costs, reducing firms’ incentives to innovate. We show that treated firms reduce innovation investment following EDGAR’s implementation. In contrast, EDGAR reporting firms’ innovation investment cuts are met with an increase in innovation investment by their technology rivals. Consistent with an increase in proprietary costs, EDGAR-filers disclose less about their innovation activities. We also find evidence of a redistribution of innovative activity from public to private firms not subject to EDGAR disclosure requirements. Overall, our results are consistent with increased disclosure dissemination crowding out investment in innovative projects, whose returns negatively depend on information spillovers. JEL Classifications: D23; L86; M40; M41; O30; O31; O32; O34.

中文翻译：

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EDGAR 意想不到的实际效果：来自企业创新的证据


摘要我们研究公司信息披露的变革以及 SEC EDGAR 系统的实施对创新的实际影响。一方面，增加信息披露的传播可以降低企业的资本成本，从而刺激创新活动。另一方面，传播的增加可能会加剧专有披露成本，从而降低公司的创新动力。我们表明，接受处理的公司在实施 EDGAR 后减少了创新投资。相比之下，EDGAR 报告公司削减创新投资的同时，其技术竞争对手则增加了创新投资。与专有成本的增加相一致，EDGAR 申报者披露的创新活动较少。我们还发现了创新活动从上市公司重新分配到私营公司而不受 EDGAR 披露要求约束的证据。总体而言，我们的结果与信息披露的增加挤出了对创新项目的投资是一致的，而创新项目的回报负向地依赖于信息溢出。 JEL 分类：D23； L86； M40； M41； O30； O31； O32； O34。