ABSTRACT I study productive activity, measurement, and compensation in a principal agent model that relaxes common restrictions on the action set of the agent, the distribution of performance measures, and the shape of the wage schedule. The solution to this relaxed problem unifies insights from extant theory and shares features with well-known empirical phenomena. In particular, the optimal outcome distribution has a kink, optimal measurement is conservative, and optimal wages ensure congruent incentives and resemble accounting-based bonus plans featuring a floor, hurdle bonus, incentive zone, and ceiling, with thresholds that may reference other performance measures. Beyond these specific insights, the paper provides a flexible framework for studying how incentives are shaped through measurement and contracts.

中文翻译：

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通过衡量和合同塑造激励措施


摘要我研究了委托代理模型中的生产活动、衡量和薪酬，该模型放宽了对代理人行动集、绩效衡量指标的分布和工资表形式的常见限制。这个轻松问题的解决方案统一了现有理论的见解，并与众所周知的经验现象具有共同的特征。特别是，最优结果分配有一个扭结，最优衡量是保守的，最优工资确保一致的激励，类似于基于会计的奖金计划，具有下限、门槛奖金、激励区域和上限，其阈值可以参考其他绩效衡量标准。除了这些具体见解之外，本文还提供了一个灵活的框架来研究如何通过衡量和合同来形成激励措施。