ABSTRACT This paper examines the influence of labor market power in the audit profession. Using a dataset of online job postings, we confirm that audit offices in more concentrated labor markets have greater labor market power and exercise it in the form of higher skill requirements and greater required effort from their auditors, at similar or slightly lower wages. We then show that client firms of audit offices in more concentrated labor markets are less likely to restate their earnings and have lower absolute discretionary accruals. These findings are only present when employees have lower mobility across professions and geographies, consistent with audit offices’ power in the local labor market explaining the results. Collectively, our findings highlight the importance of labor market power in understanding audit quality. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: J31; J40; J42; M42; M55.

中文翻译：

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劳动力市场力量对审计行业的影响


摘要本文探讨了劳动力市场力量对审计行业的影响。使用在线招聘信息数据集，我们确认，劳动力市场更加集中的审计办公室拥有更大的劳动力市场权力，并以更高的技能要求和审计员更大的努力、类似或略低的工资的形式来行使这种权力。然后，我们表明，劳动力市场更加集中的审计办公室的客户公司不太可能重述其收益，并且绝对可自由支配的应计费用也较低。这些调查结果仅在员工跨专业和地域流动性较低的情况下才会出现，这与审计办公室在当地劳动力市场上解释结果的权力一致。总的来说，我们的研究结果凸显了劳动力市场力量在理解审计质量方面的重要性。数据可用性：数据可从文中引用的来源获得。 JEL 分类：J31； J40； J42； M42； M55。