ABSTRACT Firms with correlated fundamentals often issue reports sequentially, leading to information spillovers. The theoretical literature has investigated multifirm reporting, but only when firms report simultaneously. We examine the implications of sequential reporting, where firms aim to maximize their market price and can manipulate their reports. The introduction of sequentiality significantly alters the biasing behavior of firms and the resulting informational environment relative to simultaneous reporting. In particular, a lead firm always manipulates more when reports are issued sequentially. Moreover, relative to simultaneous reporting, sequential reporting reduces the overall information available to the market about each firm, resulting in less efficient and less volatile prices. Additionally, we find that stronger correlation in firm fundamentals can amplify the lead firm’s incentive for manipulation under sequentiality, in contrast to simultaneous reporting. We offer further results regarding, for example, market response coefficients, and provide a number of empirical implications. JEL Classifications: C72; D82; D83; G14; M41.

中文翻译：

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顺序报告偏差


摘要基本面相关的公司通常会依次发布报告，从而导致信息溢出。理论文献研究了多公司报告，但仅限于公司同时报告的情况。我们研究了顺序报告的影响，公司的目标是最大化其市场价格并可以操纵其报告。顺序性的引入显着改变了公司的偏见行为以及由此产生的相对于同步报告的信息环境。特别是，当报告连续发布时，主导公司总是会操纵更多。此外，相对于同步报告，顺序报告减少了市场可获得的有关每家公司的总体信息，导致效率较低且价格波动较小。此外，我们发现，与同时报告相比，公司基本面更强的相关性可以放大领先公司在顺序下操纵的动机。我们提供了有关市场反应系数等进一步的结果，并提供了一些实证意义。 JEL 分类：C72； D82； D83； G14； M41。