ABSTRACT I evaluate the effect of financial statement audits on the governance practices of nonprofit organizations. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits revenue-based exemption thresholds, I find that financial audits cause organizations to implement governance mechanisms, such as conflict of interest policies, whistleblower policies, and formal approval of the CEO’s compensation by a committee. Consistent with these governance practices curtailing managers’ private benefits, I document reductions in nepotism and CEO-to-employee pay ratio. The results are more pronounced for organizations (1) whose audit is overseen by an audit committee, (2) that already have an independent board, and (3) that face high charity-level demand for oversight. Collectively, these findings shed light on how financial audits shape the governance practices of small, less sophisticated organizations like nonprofits in ways that go beyond financial statements’ direct use in decision-making and contracting. JEL Classifications: M42; G34; M48; L31.

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财务审计对治理实践的影响：来自非营利部门的证据


摘要我评估财务报表审计对非营利组织治理实践的影响。使用利用基于收入的豁免阈值的回归不连续性设计，我发现财务审计会导致组织实施治理机制，例如利益冲突政策、举报政策以及委员会对首席执行官薪酬的正式批准。与这些削减管理者私人利益的治理实践相一致，我记录了裙带关系和首席执行官与员工薪酬比率的减少。对于以下组织来说，结果更为明显：(1) 审计由审计委员会监督；(2) 已经拥有独立董事会；(3) 面临慈善机构层面的高监督要求。总的来说，这些发现揭示了财务审计如何塑造非营利组织等小型、不太复杂的组织的治理实践，其方式超出了财务报表直接用于决策和签订合同的范围。 JEL 分类：M42； G34； M48； L31。