The nature of the relationships among the Mexican state, organized crime and violence is much debated. Many accounts of state formation suggest that states increase their extractive and coercive capabilities in tandem: they monopolize the provision of ‘protection’ in Charles Tilly’s famous analogy. However, when unconsolidated states confront lucrative, illicit markets, state-building takes an unexpected turn. We argue that these states, like post-revolutionary Mexico, develop not as one protection racket, but as two. While the orthodox or licit protection racket collects tax from businesses and individuals in return for the protection of property and persons, the illicit protection racket (like that of a traditional mafia organization) collects extortion money from criminal groups in return for protection from prosecution. Though we use the case study of Mexico to tease out these conclusions, we argue that they can just as easily be applied to other states with weak tax bases, limited geographical reach, and profitable illicit markets.

中文翻译：

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墨西哥的国家、犯罪和暴力，1920 年至 2000 年：有罪不罚的仲裁者、胁迫者


墨西哥国家、有组织犯罪和暴力之间关系的性质备受争议。许多关于国家形成的叙述表明，国家同时增强了其榨取能力和强制能力：在查尔斯·蒂利（Charles Tilly）的著名比喻中，它们垄断了“保护”的提供。然而，当未合并的国家面对利润丰厚的非法市场时，国家建设就会发生意想不到的转变。我们认为，这些国家就像革命后的墨西哥一样，不是作为一个保护费而发展的，而是作为两个国家发展的。正统或合法的保护性敲诈勒索向企业和个人征税，以换取对财产和人员的保护，而非法保护性敲诈勒索（如传统的黑手党组织）则向犯罪集团收取勒索资金，以换取免受起诉的保护。尽管我们使用墨西哥的案例研究来梳理这些结论，但我们认为它们也可以很容易地应用于其他税基薄弱、地理范围有限和非法市场有利可图的国家。