In appraising human actions, an important consideration is whether they are free. If they are compelled, this may be excusatory; if controlled by someone other than the agent, this may mitigate; and if selfishly motivated, this may invalidate excuses. Moral appraisals of action by non‐philosophers do not normally consider whether it can be free under determinism. Metaphysical inquiry about action, by contrast, seems incomplete if it does not consider this. Are there two free will problems, one normative and one metaphysical? If so, they share such terms as ‘could’ and ‘could not’, and thoughtful non‐philosophers question their own normative assumptions once they understand the metaphysical problem determinism poses for the philosophy of action. This paper distinguishes metaphysical from action‐theoretic elements of the free will problem but also connects the metaphysical issues with normative questions about responsibility; it critically appraises some major metaphysical arguments concerning free action; and—to the extent possible in a single paper—it provides a positive account of free action neutral toward determinism.

中文翻译：

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决定论、深思熟虑和责任


在评价人类行为时，一个重要的考虑因素是它们是否自由。如果他们是被迫的，这可能是情有可原的；如果由代理人以外的其他人控制，这可能会减轻；如果出于自私的动机，这可能会使借口变得无效。非哲学家对行为的道德评价通常不考虑决定论下的行为是否可以是自由的。相比之下，关于行动的形而上学探究似乎是不完整的不是考虑一下。是否存在两个自由意志问题，一个是规范性的，一个是形而上学的？如果是这样，他们就会共享“可以”和“不能”这样的术语，而有思想的非哲学家一旦理解了决定论为行动哲学提出的形而上学问题，就会质疑自己的规范性假设。本文区分了自由意志问题的形而上学和行动理论要素，但也将形而上学问题与关于责任的规范问题联系起来；它批判性地评价了一些关于自由行动的主要形而上学论证；并且在一篇论文中尽可能地提供了对决定论中立的自由行动的积极描述。