Different species of realism have been proposed in the scientific and philosophical literature. Two of these species are direct realism and causal pattern realism. Direct realism is a form of perceptual realism proposed by ecological psychologists within cognitive science. Causal pattern realism has been proposed within the philosophy of model-based science. Both species are able to accommodate some of the main tenets and motivations of instrumentalism. The main aim of this paper is to explore the conceptual moves that make both direct realism and causal pattern realism tenable realist positions able to accommodate an instrumentalist stance. Such conceptual moves are (i) the rejection of veritism and (ii) the re-structuring of the phenomena of interest. We will then show that these conceptual moves are instances of the ones of a common realist genus we name pragmatist realism.

科学和哲学文献中提出了不同种类的实在论。其中两个种类是直接实在论和因果模式实在论。直接实在论是认知科学领域生态心理学家提出的感知实在论的一种形式。因果模式实在论是在基于模型的科学哲学中提出的。这两个物种都能够适应工具主义的一些主要原则和动机。本文的主要目的是探索使直接实在论和因果模式实在论都站得住脚的现实主义立场能够适应工具主义立场的概念转变。这些概念上的举措是（i）拒绝真实性和（ii）对感兴趣的现象进行重组。然后我们将证明这些概念性的举动是我们称之为实用主义现实主义的常见现实主义属的实例。