The tradition of natural kinds has shaped philosophical debates about scientific classification but has come under growing criticism. Responding to this criticism, Reydon and Ereshefsky present their grounded functionality account as a strategy for updating and defending the tradition of natural kinds. This article argues that grounded functionality does indeed provide a fruitful philosophical approach to scientific classification but does not convince as a general theory of natural kinds. Instead, the strengths and limitations of Reydon and Ereshefsky’s account illustrate why it is time to move beyond general definitions of “natural kind” and experiment with new philosophical frameworks.

自然种类的传统塑造了关于科学分类的哲学辩论，但受到越来越多的批评。作为对这种批评的回应，Reydon 和 Ereshefsky 提出了他们的 grounded functional account 作为更新和捍卫自然种类传统的策略。本文认为，扎根功能确实为科学分类提供了一种富有成效的哲学方法，但作为自然种类的一般理论并不能令人信服。相反，雷登和埃列舍夫斯基的叙述的优势和局限性说明了为什么现在是超越“自然种类”的一般定义并尝试新的哲学框架的时候了。