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How not to intervene on mental causes
Philosophical Studies ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2024-07-24 , DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02185-9
Thomas Kroedel

The paper critiques two recent suggestions, by Lei Zhong and Thomas Kroedel, about how to apply the interventionist theory of causation to cases where supervenient properties, particularly mental properties, are involved. According to both suggestions, we should hold variables corresponding to supervenient properties fixed when intervening on the subvenient properties with respect to a putative effect variable and vice versa. The paper argues that both suggestions are problematic. Zhong’s suggestion ultimately requires ad hoc exemptions from the holding-fixed requirement. Kroedel’s suggestion entails severe constraints on the construction of causal models. Overall, retaining the holding-fixed requirements of interventionism for cases of supervenient properties comes at a significant price.



中文翻译:


如何不干预精神原因



本文批评了雷忠和托马斯·克罗德尔最近提出的两项关于如何将干预主义因果关系理论应用于涉及附带属性(特别是精神属性)的案例的建议。根据这两个建议,当对推定效应变量的次要属性进行干预时,我们应该固定与附带属性相对应的变量,反之亦然。该论文认为,这两项建议都有问题。钟的建议最终要求对控股固定要求进行临时豁免。克罗德尔的建议对因果模型的构建提出了严格的限制。总体而言,在附带财产的情况下保留干预主义的持有固定要求要付出巨大的代价。

更新日期:2024-07-24
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