This article investigates the social welfare problem of the integrated energy system (IES), which faces supply-side and demand-side collusion attack strategies that consider the coordinated effects of two typical cyberattacks. First, an important node denial of service (DoS) attack mechanism based on malicious node collusion is proposed, which eases the restriction on the system parameter requirements. The explicit factors for deriving the optimal DoS attack strategy under limited attack resources are deduced by establishing relevant DoS attack models. Subsequently, a new collusion-based power vector false data injection (FDI) attack strategy between supply and demand sides is considered, aiming to enhance the economic disruptive capability of DoS attacks on IES. Building on the abovementioned work, a communication link FDI attack is further proposed, which can broaden the scope of attacks and disrupt defensive strategies. In addition, FDI attack termination and attack vector constraints are given. To alleviate the communication burden among attackers, the dynamic FDI attack vector is transformed into a static FDI attack determined by constant parameters, and all attack outcomes satisfying the local power constraints of malicious agents are provided. Finally, the stealthiness of the attack strategy is theoretically demonstrated and the effectiveness of the attack strategy is verified by 39-32 thermoelectric IES.

中文翻译：

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针对综合能源系统的新型共谋组合网络攻击策略


本文研究了综合能源系统（IES）的社会福利问题，该系统面临供给侧和需求侧共谋攻击策略，考虑了两种典型网络攻击的协同效应。首先，提出了一种基于恶意节点共谋的重要节点拒绝服务（DoS）攻击机制，缓解了对系统参数要求的限制。通过建立相关的DoS攻击模型，推导了有限攻击资源下推导出最优DoS攻击策略的显性因素。随后，考虑了供需双方之间一种新的基于共谋的电力矢量虚假数据注入（FDI）攻击策略，旨在增强对IES的DoS攻击的经济破坏能力。在上述工作的基础上，进一步提出了一种通信链路FDI攻击，可以扩大攻击范围并扰乱防御策略。此外，还给出了FDI攻击终止和攻击向量约束。为了减轻攻击者之间的通信负担，将动态FDI攻击向量转化为由恒定参数确定的静态FDI攻击，并提供满足恶意代理本地功率约束的所有攻击结果。最后从理论上论证了该攻击策略的隐身性，并通过39-32热电IES验证了该攻击策略的有效性。