Trolley problems and like cases are often thought to show the inadequacy of purely consequentialist moral theories. In particular, they are often taken to reveal that consequentialists unduly neglect the moral significance of the causal structure of decision problems. To precisify such critiques and one sort of deontological morality they motivate, I develop a formal modeling framework within which trolley problems can be represented as suitably supplemented structural causal models and various consequentialist and double effect‐inspired moral theories can be viewed as disagreeing over the inputs of a common decision rule.

中文翻译：

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因果建模者双效推理指南


电车难题和类似案例通常被认为表明纯粹结果主义道德理论的不足。特别是，它们常常被认为揭示了结果主义者过度忽视了决策问题因果结构的道德意义。为了精确化此类批评以及它们所激发的一种义务论道德，我开发了一个正式的建模框架，在该框架中，电车问题可以表示为适当补充的结构因果模型，并且各种结果主义和双重效应启发的道德理论可以被视为对输入的分歧共同的决策规则。