Various philosophers have recently defended norms of inquiry which forbid inquiry into questions which lack true answers. I argue that these norms are overly restrictive, and that they fail to capture an important relationship between inquiry and our position as non‐ideal epistemic agents. I defend a more flexible and forgiving norm: Epistemic Improvement. According to this norm, inquiry into a question is permissible only if it's not rational for one to be sure that by inquiring one won't improve epistemically upon the question. This norm illuminates the significant role that inquiry plays in our lives, given our epistemic nonideality, and it also motivates a robust understanding of the value of inquiry, as encompassing epistemic improvements which go beyond figuring out the answers to questions.

中文翻译：

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错误困惑的询问


最近，许多哲学家都为探究规范辩护，这些规范禁止探究缺乏真实答案的问题。我认为这些规范过于严格，并且它们未能捕捉到探究与我们作为非理想认知主体的地位之间的重要关系。我捍卫一种更灵活、更宽容的规范：认知改进。根据这一规范，只有当一个人无法理性地确定通过询问不会在认识上改进问题时，才允许对问题进行探究。鉴于我们的认知非理想性，这一规范阐明了探究在我们的生活中发挥的重要作用，并且它还激发了对探究价值的深入理解，因为它包含了超越找出问题答案的认知改进。