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On the Magnification of Small Biases in Hiring
Journal of Finance ( IF 7.6 ) Pub Date : 2024-07-18 , DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13374
SHAUN WILLIAM DAVIES , EDWARD D. VAN WESEP , BRIAN WATERS

We analyze a setting in which a board must hire a chief executive officer (CEO) after exerting effort to learn about the quality of each candidate. Optimal effort is asymmetric, implying asymmetric likelihoods of each candidate being chosen. If the board has an infinitesimal bias in favor of one candidate, it allocates effort to maximize the likelihood of that candidate being chosen. Even when the board's prior is that its preferred candidate is inferior, she may still be chosen most often. A glass ceiling can also arise whereby the tendency to hire favored candidates increases as the importance of the position increases.

中文翻译:


论招聘中小偏见的放大



我们分析了这样一种情况:董事会必须在努力了解每位候选人的素质后聘请首席执行官(CEO)。最佳努力是不对称的,这意味着每个候选人被选中的可能性不对称。如果董事会对一位候选人有极小的偏见,它就会分配努力以最大化该候选人被选中的可能性。即使董事会的优先考虑是其首选候选人较差,她仍然可能最常被选中。玻璃天花板也可能出现,随着职位重要性的增加,雇用受青睐候选人的倾向也会增加。
更新日期:2024-07-18
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