Higher‐order metaphysicians take facts to be higher‐order beings, i.e., entities in the range of irreducibly higher‐order quantifiers. In this paper, I investigate the impact of this conception of facts on the debate about the reality of tense. I identify two major repercussions. The first concerns the logical space of tense realism: on a higher‐order conception of facts, a prominent version of tense realism, dynamic absolutism, turns out to conflict with the laws of (higher‐order tense) logic. The second concerns our understanding of the positions occupying this logical space: on a higher‐order conception of facts, an attractive interpretation of the central tense realist notion of ‘facts constituting reality’ becomes unavailable. I discuss these results in the context of the more general project of higher‐order metaphysics and the (meta)metaphysics of time, drawing out their implications for the nature of the disputes both between realists and anti‐realists about tense and between different tense realist factions.

中文翻译：

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高阶存在与时间


高阶形而上学家将事实视为高阶存在，即不可约高阶量词范围内的实体。在本文中，我研究了这种事实概念对时态现实争论的影响。我确定了两个主要影响。第一个涉及时态实在论的逻辑空间：在事实的高阶概念上，时态实在论的一个突出版本，动态绝对主义，结果与（高阶时态）逻辑法则相冲突。第二个问题涉及我们对占据这一逻辑空间的立场的理解：在事实的高阶概念上，对“构成现实的事实”的中心时态现实主义概念的有吸引力的解释变得不可用。我在高阶形而上学和时间（元）形而上学的更一般项目的背景下讨论这些结果，并得出它们对实在论者和反实在论者之间关于时态以及不同时态实在论者之间的争议性质的影响。派系。