How should we weigh suffering against happiness? This paper highlights the existence of an argument from intuitively plausible axiological principles to the striking conclusion that, in comparing different populations, there exists some depth of suffering that cannot be compensated for by any measure of well-being. In addition to a number of structural principles, the argument relies on two key premises. The first is the contrary of the so-called Reverse Repugnant Conclusion. The second is a principle according to which the addition of any population of lives with positive welfare levels makes the outcome worse if accompanied by sufficiently many lives that are not worth living. I consider whether we should accept the conclusion of the argument and what we may end up committed to if we do not, illustrating the implications for the question of whether suffering in aggregate outweighs happiness among human and non-human animals, now and in future.

中文翻译：

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苦难的重量


我们应该如何权衡痛苦与幸福？本文强调了从直观上合理的价值论原理到令人震惊的结论的存在，即在比较不同人群时，存在某种程度的痛苦，这是任何幸福措施都无法弥补的。除了一些结构原则之外，这个论证还依赖于两个关键前提。第一个是与所谓的“反向令人厌恶的结论”相反的结论。第二个原则是，任何具有正福利水平的生命的增加，如果伴随着足够多的不值得生存的生命，结果都会变得更糟。我考虑我们是否应该接受这个论证的结论，以及如果我们不接受的话，我们最终可能会做出什么承诺，从而说明了人类和非人类动物现在和未来的痛苦是否总体超过幸福这一问题的含义。