We study the impact of social connections between judges and executives on the outcomes of Securities Class Action Litigation (SCAL). Judges who are socially connected to a firm's executives are significantly more likely to dismiss lawsuits against the firm. There is also evidence of faster resolution and lower payout amounts in connected cases. The favorable outcomes cannot be explained by the lower severity of connected cases, or by court, judge, or firm characteristics. Our results are more pronounced when executives connected to the judge are named defendants in the lawsuits, when connected cases involve less visible lawsuits or firms, and when connections between judges and executives are likely more direct. Our evidence indicates that social connections influence judge impartiality and meaningfully alter SCAL outcomes.

中文翻译：

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只是朋友？管理者与法官的联系


我们研究法官和高管之间的社会关系对证券集体诉讼 (SCAL) 结果的影响。与公司高管有社会关系的法官更有可能驳回针对该公司的诉讼。还有证据表明，关联案件的解决速度更快，支付金额更低。有利的结果不能用相关案件的严重程度较低或法院、法官或公司特征来解释。当与法官有联系的高管在诉讼中被指定为被告、当相关案件涉及不太明显的诉讼或公司、以及当法官和高管之间的联系可能更直接时，我们的结果会更加明显。我们的证据表明，社会关系会影响法官的公正性，并有意义地改变 SCAL 结果。