Freeloading, a challenge faced by all workgroups but particularly acute in global virtual teams (GVTs), is an increasing concern as GVTs become increasingly ubiquitous in international business settings. This study employed a quasi-experimental design to evaluate the comparative effectiveness of different strategies grounded in equity theory for mitigating freeloading behavior in GVTs. The study used a sample of 2,022 GVTs comprising 12,536 business students from 43 countries who, for two months, worked on international business consulting projects. The results indicate that freeloading could be significantly reduced if the performance management system promotes a sense of equity and fairness by visible monitoring of individual effort coupled with the threat of reciprocations for insufficient contributions. Importantly, making a lack of individual effort visible through regular peer evaluations but taking no immediate punitive action could reduce perceived fairness and actually increase freeloading. The implications of these findings for practice and future research are discussed.

中文翻译：

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减少全球虚拟团队的白费行为：一种准实验性方法


贪图便宜是所有工作组都面临的一个挑战，但在全球虚拟团队 (GVT) 中尤为严重，随着 GVT 在国际商业环境中变得越来越普遍，这一问题也日益引起人们的关注。本研究采用准实验设计来评估基于公平理论的不同策略对于减轻 GVT 的贪图便宜行为的比较有效性。该研究使用了 2,022 个 GVT 样本，其中包括来自 43 个国家的 12,536 名商科学生，他们在两个月内从事国际商业咨询项目。结果表明，如果绩效管理体系通过对个人努力的可见监控以及对贡献不足的回报的威胁来促进公平感和公平感，则可以显着减少贪图便宜的情况。重要的是，通过定期同行评估暴露个人努力不足的情况，但不立即采取惩罚行动，可能会降低感知的公平性，实际上会增加贪图便宜的行为。讨论了这些发现对实践和未来研究的影响。