Philosophers have argued that stakes affect knowledge: a given amount of evidence may suffice for knowledge if the stakes are low, but not if the stakes are high. By contrast, empirical work on the influence of stakes on ordinary knowledge ascriptions has been divided along methodological lines: “evidence‐fixed” prompts rarely find stakes effects, while “evidence‐seeking” prompts consistently find them. We present a cross‐cultural study using both evidence‐fixed and evidence‐seeking prompts with a diverse sample of 17 populations in 11 countries, speaking 14 languages. Our study is the first to use an evidence‐seeking prompt cross‐culturally, and includes several previously untested populations (including indigenous populations). Across cultures, we do not find evidence of a stakes effect with our evidence‐fixed prompt, but do with our evidence‐seeking prompt. We argue that the divergent results reveal a tension within folk epistemology: people's beliefs about when it is appropriate to ascribe knowledge differ significantly from their actual practice in ascribing knowledge.

中文翻译：

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关于知识归属的难题


哲学家认为，风险会影响知识：如果风险较低，一定数量的证据可能足以获得知识，但如果风险较高，则不足以获得知识。相比之下，关于风险对普通知识归属影响的实证研究按照方法论路线划分：“固定证据”的提示很少发现风险效应，而“寻求证据”的提示则始终能找到它们。我们利用固定证据和寻求证据的提示，对 11 个国家、讲 14 种语言的 17 个人的不同样本进行了一项跨文化研究。我们的研究是第一个跨文化使用证据寻求提示的研究，包括几个以前未经测试的人群（包括土著人群）。在不同的文化中，我们不会通过证据固定的提示找到利害效应的证据，但会通过证据寻求的提示找到证据。我们认为，不同的结果揭示了民间认识论中的紧张关系：人们对于何时适合归因知识的信念与他们归因知识的实际实践有很大不同。