Reputations for resolve are critical in international relations for deterring adversaries and reassuring partners. However, a state’s resolve is unobservable and can change unbeknownst to its audience. How does the possibility of unobserved change impact reputation dynamics? I provide a theory of long-run reputations with changing resolve via a formal model covering conflict and cooperation domains. In the model, the possibility that current reputations are based on outdated information makes the audience extend the benefit of the doubt to states with poor reputations. This leads to states building or spending their reputations depending on their current reputations. Importantly, when damaged reputations can be rebuilt, states with better reputations face stronger temptations to spend them. Thus, reputations constrain states with poor reputations the most. Further, because demonstrations of resolve improve reputations, which, in turn, reduce incentives for future demonstrations of resolve, there is a cyclical rhythm to conflict and cooperation. A major implication is that a state’s behavior changes with its reputation even if its resolve is unchanged and the stakes are identical. Reputational enforcement works, but the price is occasional breaches of trust. These results also settle a few long-standing controversies in the IR-reputation literature.

中文翻译：

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声誉与国际关系的变化


在国际关系中，决心的声誉对于威慑对手和安抚合作伙伴至关重要。然而，国家的决心是无法观察到的，并且可能会在其受众不知情的情况下发生变化。未观察到的变化的可能性如何影响声誉动态？我通过涵盖冲突和合作领域的正式模型提供了一种具有变化决心的长期声誉理论。在该模型中，当前声誉基于过时信息的可能性使得受众将怀疑的好处延伸到声誉不佳的国家。这导致国家根据其当前的声誉来建立或花费其声誉。重要的是，当受损的声誉可以重建时，声誉较好的国家就会面临更强烈的消费诱惑。因此，声誉对声誉不佳的国家的约束力最大。此外，由于表现出决心会提高声誉，这反过来又会减少未来表现出决心的激励，因此冲突与合作存在周期性节奏。一个主要的含义是，即使一个国家的决心没有改变并且利害关系相同，它的行为也会随着它的声誉而改变。声誉执法是有效的，但代价是偶尔会违反信任。这些结果也解决了 IR 声誉文献中一些长期存在的争议。