Moods, orthodoxy holds, exist outside the space of reasons. A depressed subject may change their thoughts and behaviors as a result of their depression. But, according to this view, their mood gives them no genuine reason to do so. Instead, moods are mere causal influences on cognition. The issue is that moods, with their diffuse phenomenology, appear to lack intentionality (Directionlessness). But intentionality appears to be a necessary condition on rationality (The Content Constraint). Together, these principles conflict with the idea that moods are rational states of mind (Mood Rationality). The inconsistency of these three principles is the Puzzle of Mood Rationality. Now to many, this puzzle is hardly vexing: we should reject Mood Rationality. But, I argue, Mood Rationality is true despite its unpopularity. Thus, we need another way of resolving the puzzle. To do so, I distinguish intentionality as a first‐personal, phenomenological notion from representation as a third‐personal, cognitive scientific notion. I then argue that moods satisfy a revised version of the Content Constraint and sketch an account of moods as representational but non‐intentional mental states, drawing on the Valuationist paradigm in affective neuroscience. I end by showing how this account enables us to explain moods’ rationality.

中文翻译：

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情绪理性之谜


正统观点认为，情绪存在于理性空间之外。抑郁症患者可能会因为抑郁症而改变他们的想法和行为。但是，根据这种观点，他们的情绪并没有给他们这样做的真正理由。相反，情绪只是认知的因果影响。问题在于，情绪及其分散的现象学似乎缺乏意向性（无方向性）。但意向性似乎是理性的必要条件（内容约束）。总之，这些原则与情绪是理性心理状态（情绪理性）的观念相冲突。这三个原则的不一致是情绪理性之谜。现在对许多人来说，这个难题并不令人烦恼：我们应该拒绝情绪理性。但是，我认为，情绪理性是真实的，尽管它不受欢迎。因此，我们需要另一种方法来解决这个难题。为此，我区分了作为第一人称、现象学概念的意向性和作为第三人称、认知科学概念的表征。然后，我认为情绪满足内容约束的修订版本，并借鉴情感神经科学中的评估主义范式，将情绪描述为代表性但非有意的心理状态。最后，我将展示这个解释如何使我们能够解释情绪的合理性。