A large and growing number of international organizations (IOs) are made up and governed by illiberal or outright authoritarian regimes. Many of these authoritarian IOs (AIOs) formally adopt good governance mandates, linking goals like democracy promotion, anti-corruption policies and human rights to their broader mission. Why do some AIOs adopt good governance mandates that appear to conflict with the norms and standards these regimes apply at home? We argue that AIOs adopt good governance mandates when they face substantial pressure from inside or outside the IO to adopt them. Central to our argument is that not all aspects of good governance are inherently or equally threatening to autocratic regimes. They pursue strategies that minimize the threat by externalizing policy outside the membership and strategically defining the goals to avoid or enact. This allows autocratic governments to uptake good governance talk but lessen any deep commitment to the norms and sometimes even to use them strategically to project their own power outside of the organization. Using data on 48 regional IOs with primarily autocratic membership between 1945 and 2015, we demonstrate that AIOs facing pressure from external good governance promoters will adopt good governance mandates but strategically shape those mandates in their favor if they can form bargaining coalitions with like-minded governments. The findings have sobering implications for the future of good governance promotion through IOs.

大量且数量不断增加的国际组织（IO）是由非自由或彻底的独裁政权组成和管理的。许多专制的国际组织（AIO）正式采纳了良好治理的指令，将促进民主、反腐败政策和人权等目标与其更广泛的使命联系起来。为什么一些 AIO 采取的良好治理指令似乎与这些制度在国内适用的规范和标准相冲突？我们认为，当 AIO 面临来自 IO 内部或外部的巨大压力时，它们会采用良好的治理指令。我们的论点的核心是，并非善治的所有方面都本质上或同样对独裁政权构成威胁。他们追求通过将政策外部化到会员之外并战略性地定义要避免或制定的目标来最大限度地减少威胁的战略。这使得专制政府能够接受良好治理的言论，但减少对规范的深度承诺，有时甚至战略性地利用它们将自己的权力投射到组织之外。利用 1945 年至 2015 年间 48 个主要由专制成员组成的区域国际组织的数据，我们证明，面临外部善治推动者压力的 AIO 会采纳善政指令，但如果它们能够与志同道合的政府形成讨价还价联盟，就会从战略上塑造对自己有利的指令。 。这些发现对于未来通过国际组织促进良好治理具有发人深省的意义。