The influences of a home country’s economic and political institutions on acquirers’ cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) ownership strategies remains unexplored. Acquirers face endogenous uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty that can be resolved in part by acquirers) when transferring headquarters resources to foreign target firms and exogenous uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty that cannot be resolved by acquirers) when there is an unpredictable policy change. We argue that well-developed economic and political institutions in a home country play a market-supporting and constraining role in mitigating endogenous and exogenous uncertainty respectively, enabling acquirers to seek high ownership stakes in CBAs. We also argue that the importance of a home country’s well-developed economic and political institutions for acquirers’ CBA ownership strategic decisions depends on mutual trade dependence between the acquirers’ home country and the target firms’ host countries and also on the economic capabilities of the acquirers developed in different industries and political capabilities developed in different host countries. To test these arguments, we analyze 133,623 CBAs between 2000 and 2020 and find support for the distinct roles played by a home country’s economic and political institutions.

母国的经济和政治制度对收购方跨境收购 (CBA) 所有权策略的影响仍有待探索。收购方在将总部资源转移到外国目标公司时面临内生不确定性（即收购方可以部分解决的不确定性），而当政策变化不可预测时则面临外生不确定性（即收购方无法解决的不确定性）。我们认为，母国发达的经济和政治制度分别在缓解内生和外生不确定性方面发挥着市场支持和约束作用，使收购方能够寻求在商业银行中获得高额股权。我们还认为，母国发达的经济和政治制度对于收购方 CBA 所有权战略决策的重要性取决于收购方母国与目标公司东道国之间的相互贸易依赖以及收购方的经济能力。收购者在不同的行业发展，政治能力在不同的东道国发展。为了检验这些论点，我们分析了 2000 年至 2020 年间的 133,623 个 CBA，并找到了对母国经济和政治机构所发挥的独特作用的支持。