This article intends to investigate to what extent, how, and when individuals who are below the leader’s level affect the processes and outputs of international politics. It does so by analyzing one group of below-leader actors—diplomatic negotiators in EU foreign policy. It first shows how, despite all the bureaucratic layers they are embedded in, individual negotiators have de facto acquired ultimate policymaking responsibilities, most prominently in the selection of tactics. This empowerment of individual diplomats occurs through a process of double state disaggregation: Policymaking responsibilities have shifted from the political to the bureaucratic level; then, within the latter, from the capital-based administration to the officials involved, often in single capacity, in negotiations. Next, it tests three individual characteristics (experience, style, and identity) against an original dataset of 138 questionnaires completed by EU diplomats and 17 interviews. It shows that negotiators’ personal traits explain the use of some, but not all, tactics. Specifically, they are less likely to matter when negotiators have to commit the state in significant and explicit ways, e.g., when threatening/exercising veto. When this does not happen (e.g., showing flexibility in the delegation’s position or using persuasion), the influence of individual characteristics is instead strong.

中文翻译：

---

个人、国家分解和谈判策略：来自欧盟的证据


本文旨在调查领导人以下级别的个人在多大程度上、如何以及何时影响国际政治的进程和结果。它通过分析一组领导下的行为者——欧盟外交政策中的外交谈判者来实现这一目标。它首先展示了尽管个人谈判者身处各个官僚层，但他们事实上却获得了最终的决策责任，最突出的是在策略的选择方面。这种对个别外交官的赋权是通过双重国家分解的过程实现的：决策责任已从政治层面转移到官僚层面；然后，在后者内部，从首都行政部门到参与谈判的官员，通常以单一身份参与谈判。接下来，它根据欧盟外交官填写的 138 份问卷和 17 次访谈的原始数据集测试了三个个人特征（经验、风格和身份）。它表明，谈判者的个人特质可以解释某些（但不是全部）策略的使用。具体来说，当谈判者必须以重要且明确的方式让国家做出承诺时，例如在威胁/行使否决权时，它们不太可能发挥作用。当这种情况没有发生时（例如，代表团立场表现出灵活性或使用说服手段），个人特征的影响力反而会很强。