Embedded liberalism prescribes compensating workers hurt by globalization, but government compensation programs are often criticized for their lack of responsiveness. I explain the lack of responsiveness by illuminating bureaucrats who approve the compensation programs in the frontline. I examine how career bureaucrats distribute Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) benefits, the single largest federal program in the United States that compensates workers displaced by international trade. Exploiting the quasi-random assignment of TAA petitions to individual investigators at different stages of their careers, I find that career bureaucrats are less likely to certify TAA petitions and are more likely to delay investigations during Republican presidencies relative to Democratic presidencies. This partisan performance, however, applies uniquely to career bureaucrats who are not tenured and increases in magnitude during periods of high alignment between labor and the Democratic Party. The political sustainability of globalization depends on an institutional design that shapes the career incentives of bureaucrats.

中文翻译：

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官僚如何代表经济利益：党派对贸易调整援助的控制


嵌入式自由主义规定对受全球化伤害的工人进行补偿，但政府的补偿计划经常因其缺乏回应而受到批评。我通过阐明在一线批准薪酬计划的官僚来解释缺乏响应能力。我研究了职业官僚如何分配贸易调整援助 （TAA） 福利，这是美国最大的单一联邦计划，用于补偿因国际贸易而流离失所的工人。利用将 TAA 申请准随机分配给处于职业生涯不同阶段的个别调查员，我发现职业官僚不太可能认证 TAA 申请，并且更有可能在共和党总统任期内相对于民主党总统期间延迟调查。然而，这种党派表现只适用于没有终身教职的职业官僚，并且在工党和民主党高度一致的时期，这种表现的幅度会更大。全球化的政治可持续性取决于塑造官僚职业激励的制度设计。