Embedded liberalism prescribes compensating workers hurt by globalization, but government compensation programs are often criticized for their lack of responsiveness. I explain the lack of responsiveness by illuminating bureaucrats who approve the compensation programs in the frontline. I examine how career bureaucrats distribute Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) benefits, the single largest federal program in the United States that compensates workers displaced by international trade. Exploiting the quasi-random assignment of TAA petitions to individual investigators at different stages of their careers, I find that career bureaucrats are less likely to certify TAA petitions and are more likely to delay investigations during Republican presidencies relative to Democratic presidencies. This partisan performance, however, applies uniquely to career bureaucrats who are not tenured and increases in magnitude during periods of high alignment between labor and the Democratic Party. The political sustainability of globalization depends on an institutional design that shapes the career incentives of bureaucrats.

中文翻译：

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官僚如何代表经济利益：党派对贸易调整援助的控制


根深蒂固的自由主义规定对受全球化伤害的工人进行补偿，但政府补偿计划经常因缺乏反应能力而受到批评。我通过阐释批准第一线薪酬计划的官僚来解释缺乏响应能力。我研究了职业官僚如何分配贸易调整援助（TAA）福利，这是美国最大的联邦计划，旨在补偿因国际贸易而失业的工人。利用将 TAA 请愿书准随机分配给职业生涯不同阶段的个别调查员的做法，我发现，相对于民主党总统任期，职业官僚在共和党总统任期内不太可能批准 TAA 请求，并且更有可能推迟调查。然而，这种党派表现只适用于没有终身职位的职业官僚，并且在工党和民主党高度结盟时期，其程度会增加。全球化的政治可持续性取决于塑造官僚职业激励的制度设计。