Tax collection with limited enforcement capacity may be consistent with both high- and low-delinquency regimes: high delinquency reduces the effectiveness of threats, thereby reinforcing high delinquency. We explore the practical challenges of unraveling the high-delinquency equilibrium using a mechanism design insight known as divide-and-conquer. Our preferred mechanism takes the form of prioritized iterative enforcement (PIE). Taxpayers are ranked using the ratio of expected collection to capacity use. Collection threats are issued in small batches to ensure high credibility and induce high compliance. Following repayments, liberated capacity is used to issue the next round of threats. In collaboration with a district of Lima, we experimentally assess PIE in a sample of 13,432 property taxpayers. The data validate and refine our theoretical framework. A semi-structural model suggests that keeping collection actions fixed, PIE would increase tax revenue by roughly 10%.

中文翻译：

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利用分而治之的方法改善税收征管


执法能力有限的税收征收可能与高违约率和低违约率制度相一致：高违约率会降低威胁的有效性，从而强化高违约率。我们利用一种被称为“分而治之”的机制设计见解，探讨了解决高拖欠率平衡的实际挑战。我们的首选机制采用优先迭代执行（PIE）的形式。纳税人按照预期征收额与容量使用率的比率进行排名。收款威胁是小批量发出的，以确保高可信度并诱导高合规性。偿还后，释放的能力用于发出下一轮威胁。我们与利马的一个区合作，对 13,432 名财产纳税人的样本进​​行了实验评估 PIE。这些数据验证并完善了我们的理论框架。半结构模型表明，保持征收行动固定，PIE 将使税收收入增加约 10%。