Scholars commonly argue that international law and organizations promote democracy by helping dictators to credibly commit to accountability, individual rights, and transparency. Yet dictators routinely join treaties and international organizations without transitioning to democracy. International law and organizations can generate asymmetric costs for domestic actors because international rules often apply to both governments and non-state actors, yet dictators can limit how these rules are upheld at the domestic and international level. We argue that dictators are most likely to join such treaties and international organizations when they face strong domestic political competition. We illustrate our argument using the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has extensive powers to prosecute individuals for international crimes, including crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. We show that ICC investigations and prosecutions have become a tool for incumbent dictators to target their domestic opponents. We examine the implications of our theory for multiple outcome variables, including the decision to join the ICC, violence, and the survival of dictators in power. Our evidence suggests that dictators are most likely to join the ICC when they face strong political opponents and are subsequently less likely to commit violence and more likely to survive in office.

中文翻译：

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惩罚的政治：独裁者为何加入国际刑事法院


学者们普遍认为，国际法和国际组织通过帮助独裁者可信地致力于问责、个人权利和透明度来促进民主。然而独裁者通常会加入条约和国际组织而不过渡到民主。国际法和国际组织可能会给国内行为者带来不对称成本，因为国际规则通常适用于政府和非国家行为者，但独裁者可以限制这些规则在国内和国际层面的维护方式。我们认为，当独裁者面临激烈的国内政治竞争时，他们最有可能加入此类条约和国际组织。我们利用国际刑事法院 (ICC) 来阐述我们的论点，该法院拥有广泛的权力，可以起诉犯有国际罪行的个人，包括危害人类罪、种族灭绝罪和战争罪。我们表明，国际刑事法院的调查和起诉已成为现任独裁者针对国内对手的工具。我们研究了我们的理论对多个结果变量的影响，包括加入国际刑事法院的决定、暴力和当权独裁者的生存。我们的证据表明，独裁者在面对强大的政治对手时最有可能加入国际刑事法院，从而不太可能实施暴力，更有可能在办公室里生存下来。