Mark Wilson’s “alternative history,” highly original, deeply informed, cogently argued, and elegantly written, aims to do more than chronicle the mistakes of the past. It presents a manifesto for the future, charting more profitable paths along which analytic philosophers might pursue their inquiries. Unlike some other reformers, Wilson does not take the rot to have set in fairly recently, with the ever more minute scrutiny of ever less significant questions. From his perspective, the trouble began early, with false steps made by the giants of logical empiricism, by philosophers of the stature of Carnap and Hempel and Quine. While these seminal philosophers were rightly inspired by insights of late nineteenth-century physicists, by Heinrich Hertz and Ernst Mach in particular, they misread the lessons offered by these eminent scientists. The result is a misguided picture of how to practice philosophy, although Wilson correctly acknowledges some particular insights achieved by the giants, despite the missteps of their methods.Hertz is at the heart of Wilson’s lucid and impressively researched history. In his classic Principles of Mechanics, Hertz diagnosed a recurrent problem, residing in the unclarity of some of the central concepts of Newtonian mechanics. Newton’s first law declares how “every body” will behave when it is not affected by any force. But how should we think of a “body”? Are bodies extended in space? If so, at which point (or points) are we to identify their velocity? If not, how are we supposed to derive an account of the motions of real bodies from a theory about dimensionless mass points?The Principles excavates several species of problems of this kind, affecting large parts of the physics the nineteenth century had erected on the Newtonian foundation. Wilson cites with approval Hertz’s diagnosis of the generic confusion: “We have accumulated around the terms ‘force’ and ‘electricity’ more relations than can be completely reconciled among themselves.” Hertz had recognized, he claims, an important feature of scientific practice. As theoretical proposals are developed to resolve concrete problems about different types of phenomena, the central concepts are stretched to generate recognizably successful strategies for finding solutions. In the process, those concepts “accumulate” an ever more inclusive set of “relations.” When someone as perceptive as Hertz stands back to survey the whole, the conflicts become evident. This “family” doesn’t get along.So far, Hertz has done brilliantly. Now, however, Wilson thinks, his discussion takes a wrong turn. Hertz suggests a solution to the generic problem. What is required is axiomatization. If the branch of physics in question—Newtonian mechanics, say, or Maxwellian electromagnetism—could be presented in rigorous axiomatic form, all the unclarities would be dissolved. Unsurprisingly, the pioneering logical positivists, brought up on the mathematical logic of Frege, Russell, and Hilbert, responded to this suggestion like warhorses to a bugle. “Axiomatization,” you can hear them saying excitedly to one another, “that’s something we now know how to do!” Thus philosophy of science (first) and analytic philosophy (soon after) absorbed what Wilson views as a bacillus, “theory T thinking.” The fetish for a particular style of conceptual clarification, based on finding axioms (in a first-order language with terms properly linked to experience) for a body of statements in a scientific—or nonscientific—domain took hold, surviving the midcentury transition to logical empiricism (where it was enshrined in the standard account of scientific theories), infected Quine’s influential approach to ontology, and flourishes today in the more liberated but dubious “a priori” conjectures of analytic metaphysicians, epistemologists, and metaethicists. “We do things rigorously these days,” they proudly declare, “Just like scientists, we axiomatize.”Like Carnap, Wilson has great admiration for Hertz’s classic treatise on mechanics. In his view, however, Carnap and his allies misidentified that work’s achievement. Hertz’s proposed solution was wrong—and (charitable speculation) perhaps if he had lived to see the forms in which axiomatization was later cast, he might have recognized the error. For axiomatic systems, though they might force their constructors to draw precise lines around blurry shapes, can’t respond to the predicament he diagnosed. That predicament arises from the need to reconcile claims that demonstrably work when a concept is applied to different kinds of problems. As Wilson explains, “Hertz himself is not to blame for these later abuses; his own diagnostic work was truly exemplary. It is merely that he suggested the wrong solution to the tensions that he had correctly noted” (179). Writing before the tools for formal axiomatization were at hand, Hertz can be excused for not seeing the mismatch between the difficulties he saw—the overabundance of conceptual connections—and the solution he proposed.The central chapters of Wilson’s book are devoted to showing how those kinds of conceptual difficulties can be addressed, at least in the particular form in which they arose for Hertz. My own formulation of the Hertzian predicament, derived from the passage about “accumulating relations,” is more abstract—and vaguer—than the versions arising for Newtonian mechanics. I have identified the generic problem as consisting in the existence of successful strategies for using a concept in different contexts. Wilson concentrates on the subgenus studied by Hertz: cases in which a Newtonian concept is successfully deployed, in apparently inconsistent ways, to resolve problems at different scales. As a friendly amendment to his specification, I offer my imprecise abstraction as characterizing the general problem, requiring the kind of precise specification Wilson provides if significant clusters of special cases (e.g., conceptual difficulties in classical mechanics) are to be fruitfully addressed.Troubles arise in the practice of mechanics because physicists need to address situations in which forces of different types interact to generate the dynamics of the bodies involved, and the routinely used specifications of those types of forces and those kinds of bodies clash with one another. The would-be axiomatizer seeks general notions capable of resolving the inconsistencies, while remaining rich enough to yield a solution. In practice, the ingenious physicist adjusts the specifications and the inferential connections so that “the parts no longer grind against one another inconsistently” (70). Wilson views the physicists’ successes as depending on “multiscalar tactics” and turns to applied mathematics and computer science for the general concepts underlying such tactics.We understand the workings of actual practices through articulating the multiscalar architectures that structure them. Models at different scales are linked by using feedback loops for connecting the scales, so that trial proposals for modeling are adjusted to one another. Wilson’s explanation of his central concept (multiscalar architecture) proceeds through detailed discussion of particular examples. Thus a physicist, concerned to understand the potential stresses within a rock begins by drawing from a general mathematical apparatus for representing stress, offering a trial model, then adjusting it in light of physical characterizations of the rock’s interior, refining further by taking into account of features at a finer grain. Techniques for averaging and approximating eventually bring the scales into harmony, enabling successful prediction of whether (for example) the rock will support a proposed building.The concluding chapters draw some morals for philosophy. Wilson begins by showing how, in everyday usage as in scientific discussion, causation figures in various guises. Some philosophers (he singles out Judea Pearl and James Woodward) have provided a “wonderfully detailed exploration” of some patterns of causal explanation (131). Practitioners devoted to analytic metaphysics sometimes complain of the inadequacy of this work, accusing it of failing to attend to the underlying causal processes. Wilson sees nothing but confusion in this charge. To be sure, there are types of causation (e.g., in the propagation of waves) where an appeal to causal processes is valuable (well studied in the tradition that runs from Hans Reichenbach to Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe) but the general hankering after a “metaphysics of causation” is, he suggests, a blunder, born of “theory T thinking” together with a focus on misleading examples and an utter neglect both of science and of half a century’s work in the philosophy of science. Like many philosophers of science, Wilson seems to have heard the talks frequently given about the “metaphysics of causation” with the same pain generated when fingernails scratch a blackboard.Wilson is not opposed to metaphysics. Indeed, he laments the positivist efforts to ban metaphysics as, once again, drawing the wrong lesson from the great late nineteenth-century philosopher-scientists. The aim of metaphysics is not a grand overarching axiomatized theory (“grounding fundamental physics”) but the disclosure of places in our attempts to make sense of the world where concepts are overstretched. Hertz, the great diagnostician, pioneered a “small metaphysics,” and philosophers should emulate his efforts.This is a salutary challenge, one the priests of “high analytic philosophy” and their many acolytes should take seriously. During the last half century, philosophy of science has engaged deeply with the practices of the sciences. In consequence, many of the old tenets of logical empiricist philosophy of science have been refined or overthrown. The vast majority of analytic philosophers—devoted to metaphysics or epistemology or philosophy of mind or metaethics—don’t seem to have attended to the news. They write as if the unity of the sciences isn’t simply a “working hypothesis” but an item of scriptural dogma. They tacitly treat science (total science?) as a collection of universal laws gathered together in a tidy hierarchy of axiomatic systems. This not only limits their philosophical options but inspires them to undertake quixotic quests in fantasy land.Wilson’s admirable book should be required reading not only for the analytic faithful but for all those entering the novitiate, hoping one day to contribute something to analytic metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, or metaethics. It demonstrates, clearly and decisively, the limits of the logical empiricist assumptions entrenched early in the history of analytic philosophy—while also recognizing the achievements of some of the founders in their own detailed philosophical work. Wilson has diagnosed one of the maladies of much Anglophone philosophy in our day, and simultaneously enriched the “turn to practice” in the philosophy of science.Books, we are often told, shouldn’t be judged by their covers. This one is an exception. Wilson’s hijacking of the poster for the movie Imitation of Life advertises the wit and insight with which his monograph overflows. Perhaps philosophers will be inspired by the picture to forsake imitations and return to the real thing?

中文翻译：

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模仿严谨：分析哲学的另类历史


马克·威尔逊的“另类历史”具有高度原创性、知识渊博、论证有力、文笔优美，其目的不仅仅是记录过去的错误。它提出了未来的宣言，描绘了分析哲学家可以追求的更有利可图的道路。与其他一些改革者不同，威尔逊并不认为腐败是最近才开始的，对越来越不重要的问题进行了越来越细致的审查。在他看来，麻烦很早就开始了，逻辑经验主义的巨人、卡尔纳普、亨佩尔和蒯因这样的哲学家所采取的错误步骤。虽然这些开创性的哲学家正确地受到了十九世纪末物理学家的见解的启发，特别是海因里希·赫兹和恩斯特·马赫，但他们误读了这些杰出科学家提供的教训。尽管威尔逊正确地承认了巨人所取得的一些特殊见解，尽管他们的方法存在失误，但结果却是对如何实践哲学的误导。赫兹是威尔逊清晰且令人印象深刻的研究历史的核心。赫兹在他的经典《力学原理》中诊断了一个反复出现的问题，即牛顿力学的一些核心概念的模糊性。牛顿第一定律宣布了“每个物体”在不受任何力影响时的行为方式。但我们应该如何看待“身体”呢？物体在太空中延伸吗？如果是这样，我们在哪一点（或哪一点）确定它们的速度？如果不是，我们如何从无量纲质点的理论中得出对真实物体运动的解释？《原理》挖掘了几种此类问题，影响了 19 世纪建立在牛顿力学基础上的物理学的大部分内容。基础。 威尔逊赞赏地引用了赫兹对一般性混乱的诊断：“我们围绕‘力’和‘电’这两个术语积累了更多的关系，它们之间无法完全调和。”他声称，赫兹已经认识到科学实践的一个重要特征。随着理论建议的发展来解决不同类型现象的具体问题，中心概念被延伸以产生明显成功的策略来寻找解决方案。在此过程中，这些概念“积累”了一组更具包容性的“关系”。当像赫兹这样有洞察力的人退后一步审视整体时，冲突就会变得显而易见。这个“家庭”并不和睦。 到目前为止，赫兹做得非常出色。然而，威尔逊认为，现在他的讨论转向了错误的方向。赫兹提出了解决通用问题的方案。所需要的是公理化。如果所讨论的物理学分支——比如牛顿力学或麦克斯韦电磁学——能够以严格的公理化形式呈现，那么所有的不确定性都将被消除。毫不奇怪，在弗雷格、罗素和希尔伯特的数理逻辑的熏陶下长大的逻辑实证主义者先驱们对这一建议的反应就像战马对号角的反应一样。 “公理化，”你可以听到他们兴奋地互相说道，“这就是我们现在知道该怎么做的事情！”因此，科学哲学（首先）和分析哲学（不久之后）吸收了威尔逊所认为的芽孢杆菌，即“T理论思维”。对一种特定风格的概念澄清的迷恋，基于寻找科学（或非科学）领域中的一系列陈述的公理（用一阶语言，其术语与经验正确相关），在本世纪中叶的过渡中幸存下来。逻辑经验主义（被奉为科学理论的标准解释）感染了蒯因颇具影响力的本体论方法，并在今天在分析形而上学家、认识论者和元伦理学家更为自由但可疑的“先验”猜想中蓬勃发展。 “现在我们做事严谨，”他们自豪地宣称，“就像科学家一样，我们公理化。”和卡尔纳普一样，威尔逊对赫兹的经典力学论文非常钦佩。然而，在他看来，卡尔纳普和他的盟友错误地认定了这项工作的成就。赫兹提出的解决方案是错误的——而且（慈善推测）如果他能活着看到后来公理化的形式，他可能会认识到这个错误。对于公理系统，尽管它们可能会迫使构造者在模糊的形状周围绘制精确的线条，但无法对他诊断的困境做出反应。这种困境是由于需要调和一些主张，当一个概念应用于不同类型的问题时，这些主张显然是有效的。正如威尔逊解释的那样，“赫兹本人不应为这些后来的滥用行为负责；他应该为赫兹本人负责。”他自己的诊断工作确实堪称典范。只是他对他正确指出的紧张局势提出了错误的解决方案”（179）。赫兹在正式公理化工具出现之前就开始写作，他没有看到他所看到的困难（过多的概念联系）与他提出的解决方案之间的不匹配，这是情有可原的。威尔逊书中的中心章节致力于展示如何解决这些概念上的困难，至少以赫兹出现的特定形式。我自己对赫兹困境的表述源自有关“累积关系”的段落，它比牛顿力学的版本更加抽象和模糊。我认为普遍的问题在于存在在不同背景下使用概念的成功策略。威尔逊专注于赫兹研究的亚类：以明显不一致的方式成功运用牛顿概念来解决不同规模问题的案例。作为对他的规范的友好修改，我提供了我的不精确抽象来描述一般问题，如果要有效地解决大量特殊情况（例如，经典力学中的概念困难），则需要威尔逊提供的那种精确规范。在力学实践中，因为物理学家需要解决不同类型的力相互作用以产生所涉及的物体的动力学的情况，以及这些类型的力和这些类型的物体的常规使用的规范相互冲突。未来的公理化者寻求能够解决不一致问题的一般概念，同时保持足够丰富的内容以产生解决方案。在实践中，这位聪明的物理学家调整了规格和推理连接，以便“零件之间不再不一致地磨削”（70）。威尔逊认为物理学家的成功取决于“多标量策略”，并转向应用数学和计算机科学来寻找这种策略背后的一般概念。我们通过阐明构建实际实践的多标量架构来了解实际实践的运作方式。通过使用连接尺度的反馈回路来链接不同尺度的模型，从而使建模的试验建议相互调整。威尔逊通过对特定示例的详细讨论对其中心概念（多标量架构）进行了解释。因此，关心了解岩石内潜在应力的物理学家首先从表示应力的通用数学装置中提取，提供试验模型，然后根据岩石内部的物理特征对其进行调整，并考虑到进一步完善具有更细粒度的特征。平均和近似技术最终使尺度达到和谐，从而能够成功预测（例如）岩石是否会支撑拟议的建筑。最后的章节得出了一些哲学道德。威尔逊首先展示了在日常使用和科学讨论中如何以各种形式表现因果关系。一些哲学家（他特别提到朱迪亚·珀尔和詹姆斯·伍德沃德）对因果解释的某些模式进行了“非常详细的探索”（131）。致力于分析形而上学的实践者有时会抱怨这项工作的不足，指责它未能关注潜在的因果过程。威尔逊认为这种指控只是混乱。可以肯定的是，因果关系有多种类型（例如，在波的传播中），其中对因果过程的诉求是有价值的（从汉斯·赖辛巴赫到韦斯利·萨尔蒙和菲尔·道的传统中得到了充分的研究），但他认为，对“因果关系形而上学”的普遍渴望是一种这种错误源于“T 理论思维”，加上对误导性例子的关注，以及对科学和半个世纪科学哲学工作的完全忽视。和许多科学哲学家一样，威尔逊似乎经常听到有关“因果形而上学”的讨论，就像指甲划黑板时产生的痛苦一样。威尔逊并不反对形而上学。事实上，他哀叹实证主义禁止形而上学的努力再次从十九世纪末伟大的哲学家科学家那里吸取了错误的教训。形而上学的目标不是一个宏大的公理化理论（“基础物理学”），而是揭示我们试图理解世界时概念被过度延伸的地方。伟大的诊断学家赫兹开创了“小形而上学”，哲学家们应该效仿他的努力。这是一个有益的挑战，“高级分析哲学”的牧师和他们的众多追随者应该认真对待这一挑战。在过去的半个世纪中，科学哲学深入参与了科学实践。结果，逻辑经验主义科学哲学的许多旧原则被完善或推翻。绝大多数致力于形而上学、认识论、心灵哲学或元伦理学的分析哲学家似乎并没有关注这些新闻。他们的写作就好像科学的统一性不仅仅是一个“可行的假设”，而是一个圣经教条。 他们默认将科学（整体科学？）视为普遍法则的集合，这些普遍法则聚集在公理系统的整洁层次结构中。这不仅限制了他们的哲学选择，而且激励他们在幻想世界中进行堂吉诃德式的探索。威尔逊这本令人钦佩的书不仅应该为分析信徒阅读，也应该为所有进入见习阶段的人阅读，希望有一天能为分析形而上学、认识论做出贡献。 、心灵哲学或元伦理学。它清楚而果断地证明了分析哲学历史早期根深蒂固的逻辑经验主义假设的局限性，同时也承认了一些创始人在他们自己详细的哲学著作中所取得的成就。威尔逊诊断了当今许多英语国家哲学的弊病之一，同时丰富了科学哲学中的“转向实践”。我们经常被告知，不应以封面来评判书籍。这是一个例外。威尔逊劫持了电影《模仿生活》的海报，宣传了他的专着中充满的智慧和洞察力。也许哲学家们会受到这幅画的启发，放弃模仿，回归真实？