Over the course of the book Mumford defends what he calls “soft Parmenideanism.” Soft Parmenideanism has an ontological component and a methodological component. The ontological component: there are no negative entities (such things as absences or omissions or voids or nothings). The methodological component: we should not reject negative entities at all cost, but should rather accept negative entities if they are indispensable components of the best theories and they cannot be reduced to positive entities. I will briefly mention one concern I have about this methodology. It says that we should believe in negative entities if they are irreducible components of the best theories. Here Mumford is explicit that he means the best possible theories, not just the best theories we have managed to come up with (197). But how is this different from saying that we should believe in negative entities if they are irreducible components of the true theories regarding the world? And who would deny that?After introducing soft Parmenideanism in chapter 1, the rest of the book is concerned with showing that negative entities are not, in fact, indispensable and irreducible components of the best theories.In chapter 2 Mumford discusses negative properties. Should we believe there are such things as negative properties—for example, the property of not being red—or can we instead make do with just positive properties, as well as objects failing to instantiate certain positive properties?Mumford examines arguments for and against the reality of negative properties and finds them all wanting. For example, it might be thought that someone becomes wet from rain because they instantiate a negative property, that of not having an umbrella. But, Mumford responds, it seems more plausible to say that someone becomes wet because they are rained on, not because they instantiate a negative property. At most we can say that had they had an umbrella then they would not have gotten wet.In chapter 3 Mumford goes on to discuss what he calls “nonentities.” This includes a wide range of purported negative particulars (as opposed to properties)—for example, absences, holes, shadow, gaps. Mumford helpfully subdivides these negative particulars into the following categories: nonbeings, limits, privations, omissions, negative epistemic states, normative negatives, and logical/mathematical constructs.This chapter covers a lot of ground, and is difficult to summarize. One point worth mentioning is Mumford’s discussion of negative facts—that is, facts such as “such-and-such philosophers are the only philosophers in the room.” Mumford contends that, rather than accept negative facts of the form “there are no more philosophers in the room,” we should instead think that we are simply denying that there are more philosophers in the room.Mumford ultimately concludes that all of the purported negative entities discussed in this chapter either don’t exist or are not actually negative entities of a sort that would be rejected by the soft Parmenidean.Mumford proceeds in chapter 4 to discuss causation by absence. Causation by absence is objectionable for several reasons. (1) It reifies absences and turns them into really existing things. (2) There is no plausible account of how a negative entity such as an absence could cause something to happen. (3) If we accept absences as causes, then we will end up with too many causes. The absence of water causes the plant to die, but we might also be forced to say that the absence of Julius Caesar causes the death of the plant, since Julius Caesar could have watered the plant. Attempts to mark a nonarbitrary distinction between the spurious and the genuine case of causation by absence do not work.By contrast, noncausal explanations appealing to absences are fine. Example: Part of the explanation for why the plant died was because I did not water it. Had I watered the plant, it would not have died. This sort of explanation does not reify absences.In chapter 5 Mumford discusses mere possibilities, possibilities that are possible but not actual. It is best not to reify mere possibilities. We should instead think of mere possibilities as fictions. But this leaves the difficulty of distinguishing between those fictions that are genuine possibilities and those that are not. There are different ways this can be done, but Mumford’s preferred view is that facts regarding what is possible are grounded in reality (i.e., in what actually exists). For example, the powers instantiated in actually existing things can ground the distinction between what is possible and impossible—for example, Rosa possibly visits London because she instantiated powers which would enable her to travel to London, but she cannot jump to the moon since she lacks any powers which would enable her to do so.There is no chapter 6. I don’t know if this is deliberate.Chapter 7 discusses perception of absences. Is it really possible to perceive such things as absences (e.g., the absence of chap. 6)? If so, it looks like we would be committed to an objectionable sort of negative entity. Another general problem for perception of absences: a necessary condition for perception is that the right sort of causal connection obtains between the perceiver and the thing perceived. But absences do not cause anything in the perceptual system of the perceiver.Mumford’s own favored account of absences is this. Mumford contends that our apparent perception of absences is an evolved faculty which results in a perceptual process whereby we directly and noninferentially seem to experience absences. The process is direct and noninferential because this is fitness enhancing, since it quickly informs us of useful information regarding our environment. But the outcome of this process is an illusory perception of something that is not really there, since absences, being nonentities, cannot really exist, and only presences exist in our environment to be seen.Chapter 8 discusses empty reference—that is, alleged reference to things that do not exist. Mumford’s approach: whatever is referred to exists. This is because reference is a “real relation” between things, and those things must exist in order for the relation to obtain. So, there is no genuine reference to something that does not exist. Nevertheless, we can make statements about nonexistent things, as to talk about something need not be to refer to that thing. Ultimately, talk of what does not exist should be understood in fictionalist terms, but not in a way that requires ontological commitment to fictional objects. Talk of what does not exist involves a sort of pretense. The pretense is insofar as we pretend to refer to something, when there does not exist any such thing to which we might refer.In chapter 9 Mumford discusses negative truths, such truths as “There is not a hippopotamus in the room.” Do truths of this sort have truthmakers? If the statement is made true by what is not, how is that possible? How could what is not bear a relation to a statement or proposition, in order to make the statement or proposition true? Isn’t this to reify what is not (i.e., what is nonexistent)? These problems are particularly acute for negative existential claims, but negative claims are not all negative existential claims. Some, for example, are negative predications (“He is not sick”), or more generally claims or truths regarding what is not the case.Ultimately, in this chapter Mumford does not resolve the problem of negative truths. But he thinks that the ideas contained in the next chapter allow progress to be made on the matter. The idea he eventually endorses is this: we should think of statements expressing negative truths in terms of denials. When we say that there is no hippopotamus in the room we are simply denying that there is a hippopotamus in the room. This denial can be correct even without a truthmaker, and what’s more, it does not commit us to the existence of any negative entities.Chapter 10 gives a fuller account of negation and denial. Mumford argues that “basic negative truths can be understood not as affirmations but as denials.” But he concedes that his account of denial does not account for all negative truths. Here I will focus on his account of basic negative truths.Mumford argues that we should accept that we often make denials that need not be interpreted as affirmations of negations. In defense of this thesis Mumford argues against the “equivalence thesis,” which claims that denials are equivalent to affirmations of negations. Mumford contends that there are a number of differences between assertions and denials. For example, assertions aim at truth, while denials reject truths; and assertions commit to a way the world is, while denials make no such commitment. Notably, since denials do not aim at truth, they do not require truthmakers. What’s more, assertions and denials are governed by different epistemic norms. For example, one generally needs good reasons to endorse an assertion, while one does not similarly need such good reasons to engage in a denial.Notably, many of the purported differences between assertion and denial stem from the fact that, according to Mumford, all it takes to deny that P is that one withholds judgment that P—it does not require that one affirm not-P (although this is another way to deny that P). This is why a denial need take no stance regarding the way the world is, and it is why the epistemic norms governing denial are lax relative to the epistemic norms governing assertions.I wonder, however, if this makes Mumford’s rejection of the equivalence thesis less philosophical interesting. We can, of course, use words like “denial” and “deny” so that one “denies” P if either one fails to affirm P or if one affirms not-P. But those who endorse the equivalence thesis, and so think that one denies P if and only if one asserts not-P, are presumably not using words like “denial” and “deny” in the weak way in which Mumford uses those terms. I’m not sure there is a substantive philosophical disagreement here, rather than a merely verbal dispute. And it isn’t as if Mumford’s use of terms like “denial” and “deny” is a better fit for how those terms are understood in vernacular English. For any proposition P, any given rock fails to affirm P. By Mumford’s lights, then, the rock denies that P. That seems wrong.Chapter 11 is the final chapter. Here Mumford sums up his discussion of putative negative entities and concludes that soft Parmenideanism is vindicated: there are no good reasons to believe in negative entities.Overall, the book is very clearly written, and for the most part convincingly argued. It should be read by anyone interested in negative entities.

中文翻译：

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缺席与虚无：虚无的哲学


在本书中，芒福德捍卫了他所谓的“软巴门尼德主义”。软巴门尼德主义具有本体论成分和方法论成分。本体论成分：不存在负面实体（例如缺席、遗漏、空洞或虚无）。方法论部分：我们不应该不惜一切代价拒绝消极实体，而应该接受消极实体，如果它们是最好理论不可或缺的组成部分并且不能还原为积极实体。我将简要提及我对这种方法的一个担忧。它说，如果消极实体是最好理论的不可约组成部分，我们就应该相信它们。在这里，芒福德明确表示，他指的是可能的最佳理论，而不仅仅是我们设法提出的最佳理论（197）。但这与说如果消极实体是关于世界的真实理论不可简化的组成部分，我们就应该相信它们有什么不同呢？谁会否认这一点呢？在第一章中介绍了软巴门尼德主义之后，本书的其余部分致力于证明否定实体实际上并不是最好的理论不可或缺的和不可简化的组成部分。在第二章中，芒福德讨论了否定属性。我们是否应该相信存在诸如消极属性之类的东西——例如，不呈红色的属性——或者我们可以只用积极的属性，以及无法实例化某些积极属性的对象吗？芒福德检查了支持和反对的论点负面特性的现实，并发现它们全都缺乏。例如，人们可能会认为某人被雨淋湿了，因为他们实例化了一个负面属性，即没有带伞。 但是，芒福德回应道，似乎更合理的说法是，某人被雨淋湿，而不是因为他们实例化了负面属性。我们最多可以说，如果他们有一把雨伞，那么他们就不会被淋湿。 在第三章中，芒福德继续讨论他所说的“无足轻重的人”。这包括各种所谓的负面细节（与属性相反），例如缺席、漏洞、阴影、间隙。芒福德很有帮助地将这些负面细节细分为以下类别：非存在、限制、匮乏、遗漏、负面认知状态、规范负面和逻辑/数学结构。本章涵盖了很多基础内容，很难总结。值得一提的是芒福德对消极事实的讨论，即“某某哲学家是房间里唯一的哲学家”之类的事实。芒福德认为，我们不应该接受“房间里不再有哲学家”这样的负面事实，而应该认为我们只是在否认房间里有更多哲学家。芒福德最终得出的结论是，所有所谓的负面事实本章中讨论的实体要么不存在，要么实际上不是软巴门尼德主义所拒绝的消极实体。芒福德在第四章中继续讨论缺席的因果关系。由于多种原因，缺席因果关系是令人反感的。 （1）它将缺席具体化，并将其变成真实存在的事物。 (2) 对于诸如缺席之类的负面实体如何导致某些事情发生，没有合理的解释。 (3) 如果我们接受缺勤作为原因，那么我们最终会得到太多的原因。 没有水会导致植物死亡，但我们也可能被迫说，凯撒大帝的缺席导致了植物的死亡，因为凯撒大帝可以给植物浇水。试图通过缺席来区分虚假因果关系和真实因果关系的尝试是行不通的。相比之下，诉诸缺席的非因果解释是可以的。示例：植物死亡的部分原因是因为我没有给它浇水。如果我给植物浇水，它就不会死。这种解释并没有具体化缺席。在第五章中，芒福德讨论了纯粹的可能性，即可能但不实际的可能性。最好不要具体化单纯的可能性。相反，我们应该将纯粹的可能性视为虚构。但这留下了区分哪些虚构是真正的可能性，哪些不是的困难。有不同的方法可以做到这一点，但芒福德更喜欢的观点是，关于可能发生的事情的事实是基于现实的（即实际存在的）。例如，在实际存在的事物中实例化的权力可以区分什么是可能的，什么是不可能的——例如，罗莎可能访问伦敦，因为她实例化了使她能够前往伦敦的权力，但她不能跳到月球，因为她缺乏任何权力使她能够这样做。没有第 6 章。我不知道这是否是故意的。第 7 章讨论了对缺勤的看法。真的有可能将这种事情视为缺席（例如，第 6 章的缺席）吗？如果是这样，我们似乎就会陷入一种令人反感的负面实体之中。 缺席感知的另一个普遍问题是：感知的必要条件是感知者和感知到的事物之间存在正确的因果关系。但缺席不会对感知者的感知系统造成任何影响。芒福德自己最喜欢的缺席解释是这样的。芒福德认为，我们对缺席的明显感知是一种进化的能力，它导致了一个感知过程，在这个过程中，我们直接地、非推论地似乎经历了缺席。这个过程是直接的、非推论的，因为它可以增强适应性，因为它可以快速告知我们有关我们环境的有用信息。但这个过程的结果是对不真实存在的事物的虚幻感知，因为缺席是非实体，不可能真正存在，只有存在存在于我们的环境中才能被看到。第八章讨论空指称——即所谓的指称对于不存在的事物。芒福德的方法：所指的一切都存在。这是因为指称是事物之间的“真实关系”，而这些事物必须存在才能获得这种关系。因此，没有真正提及不存在的东西。然而，我们可以对不存在的事物做出陈述，因为谈论某事物不一定是指该事物。最终，谈论不存在的东西应该用虚构主义的术语来理解，而不是以需要对虚构对象进行本体论承诺的方式来理解。谈论不存在的事物涉及一种假装。假装是指我们假装提及某物，而实际上不存在我们可以提及的任何此类事物。 在第 9 章中，芒福德讨论了否定真理，例如“房间里没有河马。” 这种真理有真理制造者吗？如果这个陈述是由事实证明的，那怎么可能呢？不存在的事物怎么可能与某个陈述或命题有关系，以使该陈述或命题为真？这不是要具体化不存在的东西（即不存在的东西）吗？这些问题对于消极的存在主张来说尤其严重，但消极主张并不都是消极的存在主张。例如，有些是消极的预测（“他没有生病”），或者更一般地说是关于事实并非如此的主张或事实。最终，芒福德在本章中没有解决消极事实的问题。但他认为下一章中包含的想法可以让这个问题取得进展。他最终赞同的想法是：我们应该考虑以否认的方式表达消极事实的陈述。当我们说房间里没有河马时，我们只是在否认房间里有河马。即使没有真理制造者，这种否认也可能是正确的，而且，它并不让我们承认任何负面实体的存在。第十章对否定和否认进行了更全面的描述。芒福德认为，“基本的消极真理不能被理解为肯定，而是被理解为否认。”但他承认他的否认并不能解释所有负面事实。在这里，我将重点关注他对基本否定真理的描述。芒福德认为，我们应该接受这样一个事实：我们经常做出不需要被解释为否定的肯定的否认。为了捍卫这一论点，芒福德反对“等价论”，该论声称否认等同于否定的肯定。芒福德认为断言和否认之间存在许多差异。 例如，断言旨在真理，而否认则拒绝真理；断言承诺世界的现状，而否认则不做出这样的承诺。值得注意的是，由于否认的目的不是真相，因此它们不需要真相制造者。更重要的是，断言和否认受不同的认知规范管辖。例如，一个人通常需要充分的理由来支持一项主张，而一个人则不需要同样的充分理由来进行否认。值得注意的是，主张和否认之间的许多所谓的差异源于这样一个事实：根据芒福德的说法，所有的否认P就是人们保留对P的判断——它不需要人们肯定非P（尽管这是否认P的另一种方式）。这就是为什么否认不需要对世界本来的样子采取任何立场，这就是为什么管理否认的认知规范相对于管理断言的认知规范是宽松的。然而，我想知道，这是否会让芒福德对等价命题的拒绝变得不那么重要。哲学有趣。当然，我们可以使用诸如“否认”和“否认”之类的词，这样，如果一个人未能肯定 P 或一个人肯定非 P，那么就“否认”P。但那些支持等价论点并认为当且仅当断言非 P 时才否认 P 的人可能不会以芒福德使用这些术语的弱方式使用“否认”和“否认”等词语。我不确定这里是否存在实质性的哲学分歧，而不仅仅是口头争论。芒福德对“denial”和“deny”等术语的使用似乎并不更适合白话英语中对这些术语的理解。对于任何命题P，任何给定的岩石都无法肯定P。那么，根据芒福德的观点，岩石否认P。这似乎是错误的。第十一章是最后一章。 在这里，芒福德总结了他对假定的消极实体的讨论，并得出结论，温和的巴门尼德主义得到了证实：没有充分的理由相信消极实体。总的来说，这本书写得非常清楚，而且大部分内容都令人信服。任何对负面实体感兴趣的人都应该阅读它。