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Epistemic infringement and the wrong of propagandizing
The Philosophical Quarterly ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2024-06-26 , DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae076
Lauren Leydon-Hardy 1
Affiliation  

The first part of this paper presents a dilemma for arationalism about propaganda. Arationalists hold that propaganda is constitutively reliant on bypassing audience-side rationality. According to the twin pillars of arationalism, then, propaganda is distinguished by the arationalism of audience-side uptake, and criticizable for its circumvention of audience-side rationality. Here, I argue that if the twin pillars of arationalism hold, then arationalists must either deny that bald-faced propaganda is propaganda or deny that bald-faced propaganda is objectionable qua propaganda. Against arationalism, I argue that propagandizing is apt to epistemically infringe on an audience. Propagandizing constitutively involves the systematic contravention of the norms typifying the relationship between communicator and audience, with the characteristic effect of eroding the audience's epistemic agency. The epistemic harm of propaganda is that it has the power to alienate its audience from itself both epistemically and politically by illegitimately constraining what is epistemically possible for its audience.

中文翻译:


认知侵权与宣传错误



本文的第一部分提出了非理性主义宣传的困境。无理性主义者认为,宣传本质上依赖于绕过受众理性。那么,根据非理性主义的两大支柱,宣传的特点是受众方接受的非理性主义,并因其规避受众方理性而受到批评。在这里,我认为,如果非理性主义的两大支柱成立,那么非理性主义者必须要么否认秃头宣传是宣传,要么否认秃头宣传是令人反感的宣传。反对非理性主义,我认为宣传很容易在认知上侵犯观众。本质上的宣传涉及对传播者与受众之间关系的典型规范的系统性违反,其典型效果是侵蚀受众的认知机构。宣传的认知危害在于,它有能力通过非法限制受众认知上的可能性,在认知上和政治上疏远受众。
更新日期:2024-06-26
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