We show that public banks face negative stock return jumps after missing their earnings per share (EPS) targets, and theoretically and quantitatively link these jumps to bunching behavior in the EPS surprise distribution. Bunching banks cut deposit rates to meet their targets, but do so at the expense of deposit outflows and franchise value losses. Local competitors, including private banks unexposed to capital market pressure, increase deposit rates, compensating depositors for switching. Our results provide new evidence that performance targeting incentives can affect consumer product prices, and suggest that competition may provide a check on public firms' targeting efforts.

中文翻译：

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在竞争产品市场中实现目标


我们表明，公共银行在未达到每股收益（EPS）目标后面临股票回报率负跳跃，并从理论上和定量上将这些跳跃与每股收益意外分布中的聚集行为联系起来。捆绑银行降低存款利率以实现其目标，但这样做的代价是存款外流和特许经营价值损失。当地竞争对手，包括未受到资本市场压力的私人银行，提高存款利率，补偿储户的转换。我们的结果提供了新的证据，表明绩效目标激励措施可以影响消费品价格，并表明竞争可能会对上市公司的目标努力进行检查。