According to the principle of indifference, when a set of possibilities is evidentially symmetric for you – when your evidence no more supports any one of the possibilities over any other – you're required to distribute your credences uniformly among them. Despite its intuitive appeal, the principle of indifference is often thought to be unsustainable due to the problem of multiple partitions: Depending on how a set of possibilities is divided, it seems that sometimes, applying indifference reasoning can require you to assign incompatible credences to equivalent possibilities. This paper defends the principle of indifference from the problem of multiple partitions by offering two guides for how to respond. The first is for permissivists about rationality, and is modeled on permissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence sometimes does not uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. The second is for impermissivists about rationality, and is modeled on impermissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence does always uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. What appears to be a decisive objection against the principle of indifference is in fact an instance of a general challenge taking different forms familiar to both permissivists and impermissivists.

中文翻译：

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如何做到冷漠


根据冷漠原则，当一组可能性对你来说显然是对称的时——当你的证据不再支持任何一种可能性而不是其他可能性时——你需要在它们之间均匀地分配你的信任。尽管具有直观的吸引力，但由于多重划分的问题，冷漠原则通常被认为是不可持续的：根据一组可能性的划分方式，有时，应用冷漠推理可能需要您将不相容的信任分配给等价的信任。的可能性。本文通过提供两个应对指南来捍卫多重分区问题的无差别原则。第一个是关于理性的放任主义者，并且以放任主义者的论点为模型，他们主张证据有时不能唯一地确定完全理性的信任函数。第二个是针对关于理性的不允许主义者，并且以不允许主义者的论点为模型，该论点主张证据体总是唯一地确定完全理性的信任函数。看似对冷漠原则的决定性反对，实际上是一种普遍挑战的一个例子，其形式多种多样，为许可主义者和非许可主义者所熟悉。