Financial institutions received investments under the Troubled Asset Relief Program in a bad state of the world but repaid them in a relatively good state. We show that the recipients paid considerably lower returns to taxpayers compared to private‐market securities with similar risk over the same investment horizon, resulting in a subsidy of over $50 billion on the preferred equity investment by the government. Ex‐post renegotiation of contract terms limited the upside gains received by taxpayers in good times and contributed to the subsidy. These findings have important implications for the design and implementation of future bailouts. Our simple methodology for calculating the subsidy can be applied to evaluate the financial costs of other bailouts.

中文翻译：

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银行是否向不良资产救助计划的纳税人支付了公平的回报？


金融机构在世界状况不佳的情况下接受了问题资产救助计划下的投资，但在相对良好的情况下偿还了这些投资。我们发现，与相同投资期限内具有类似风险的私募市场证券相比，受助者向纳税人支付的回报要低得多，从而导致政府对优先股权投资提供了超过 500 亿美元的补贴。合同条款的事后重新谈判限制了纳税人在经济繁荣时期获得的上行收益，并有助于补贴。这些发现对未来救助的设计和实施具有重要意义。我们计算补贴的简单方法可用于评估其他救助的财务成本。