This paper argues that there are two importantly distinct normative relations that can be referred to using phrases like ‘X is obligated to Y,’ ‘Y has a right against X,’ or ‘X wronged Y.’ When we say that I am obligated to you not to read your diary, one thing we might mean is that I am subject to a deontological constraint against reading your diary that gives me a non‐instrumental, agent‐relative reason not to do so, and which you are typically in a unique position to waive with consent. I call this first relation the constraint relation. A second thing we might mean is that you are in a position to fittingly hold me personally accountable for reading your diary by demanding that I not read your diary, resenting me if I do so without excuse, and deciding whether to forgive me for this afterwards. I call this second relation the accountability relation. Though these two kinds of directed obligation often coincide, I argue that they are extensionally dissociable and play different normative roles. We cannot provide an adequate theory of ‘obligation to’ until we recognize that this phrase denotes not one relation, but two.

中文翻译：

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定向义务的两个概念


本文认为，当我们说“我有义务”时，可以使用诸如“X 对 Y 负有义务”、“Y 对 X 有权利”或“X 冤枉了 Y”等短语来指代两种重要的不同规范关系。如果你不读你的日记，我们可能的意思是，我受到一种义务论的约束，反对阅读你的日记，这给了我一个非工具性的、与代理人相关的理由不这样做，而你通常处于一种经同意放弃的独特地位。我将第一个关系称为约束关系。我们可能想说的第二件事是，你可以要求我不读你的日记，如果我无缘无故地读你的日记，你就会怨恨我，并在事后决定是否原谅我。 。我将第二种关系称为责任关系。尽管这两种直接义务经常重合，但我认为它们在外延上是可分离的，并且发挥着不同的规范作用。除非我们认识到这个短语所指的不是一种关系，而是两种关系，否则我们无法提供充分的“义务”理论。