I construe Relevant Alternatives Theory (RAT) as an abstract combination of anti-skepticism and epistemic modesty, then re-evaluate the challenge posed to it by the missed clue counterexamples of Schaffer. The import of this challenge has been underestimated, as Schaffer’s specific argument invites distracting objections. I offer a novel formalization of RAT, accommodating a suitably wide class of concrete theories of knowledge. Then, I introduce ‘abstract missed clue cases’ and prove that every RA theory, as formalized, admits such a case. This yields an argument—in Schaffer’s spirit—that resists easy dismissal.

中文翻译：

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相关替代方案和错过的线索：Redux


我将相关替代理论（RAT）解释为反怀疑主义和认知谦虚的抽象组合，然后重新评估谢弗错过的线索反例对其提出的挑战。这一挑战的重要性被低估了，因为谢弗的具体论点招致了分散注意力的反对意见。我提出了一种新颖的 RAT 形式化，可以容纳相当广泛的具体知识理论。然后，我引入“抽象遗漏线索案例”，并证明每一个形式化的 RA 理论都承认这样的案例。这产生了一个论点——本着谢弗的精神——拒绝轻易驳回。