The spikes in energy prices observed following recent major global shocks—e.g., COVID-19 and Russia-Ukraine war —as well as issues related to the diffusion of renewable energy power generation, have reopened the debate about the design of electricity markets and the role of the “state” vs. “market” in the electricity markets governance. In this article, we contribute to this debate by looking at the effect of economic crises on energy markets regulation. We find that, historically, economic crises have been associated with a persistent tightening in energy markets regulation (i.e., more restrictions to competition), with the effect being larger during periods of high economic and policy uncertainty and when governments were politically strong—that is, characterized by a larger majority, in majoritarian systems, and at the beginning of their mandate.

中文翻译：

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危机与能源市场改革


最近发生的重大全球冲击（例如 COVID-19 和俄罗斯-乌克兰战争）之后观察到的能源价格飙升，以及与可再生能源发电扩散相关的问题，重新引发了关于电力市场设计及其作用的辩论电力市场治理中“国家”与“市场”的区别。在本文中，我们通过研究经济危机对能源市场监管的影响来为这场辩论做出贡献。我们发现，从历史上看，经济危机一直与能源市场监管的持续收紧（即对竞争的更多限制）有关，在经济和政策高度不确定时期以及政府政治强势时，其影响更大——即，其特点是在多数制度中以及在其任期开始时获得多数。