Equity crowdfunding (ECF) allows amateur investors to fund startups and small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). Unlike initial public offerings, ECF requires minimal disclosures, fast-tracking equity raising. ECF's popularity has surged, yet little is known about how assurance services might impact investor decisions. Drawing on regulatory focus theory, we examine how independent assurance, pitch characteristics, and investor regulatory focus influence investment decisions in ECF. Our results support our hypotheses that audits of historical financial information increase ECF investors’ likelihood to invest. Further, interactions between the audit, investors’ regulatory focus, and the regulatory focus of the ECF pitch increase investment such that the presence of an audit increases investment for prevention-focused individuals, and especially the audit is most likely to increase investment for prevention-focused investors when the SME’s pitch is also prevention-focused. Overall, we contribute to literature by exploring the influence of assurance in a new context of ECF, shedding light on previously unexplored aspects of investor decision-making.

股权众筹 (ECF) 允许业余投资者为初创企业和中小企业 (SME) 提供资金。与首次公开募股不同，ECF 需要最少的披露、快速的股权融资。 ECF 的受欢迎程度大幅上升，但人们对于担保服务可能如何影响投资者决策却知之甚少。借鉴监管焦点理论，我们研究了独立保证、推介特征和投资者监管焦点如何影响 ECF 的投资决策。我们的结果支持我们的假设，即对历史财务信息的审计会增加 ECF 投资者的投资可能性。此外，审计、投资者的监管重点以及 ECF 推介的监管重点之间的相互作用会增加投资，因此审计的存在会增加对以预防为重点的个人的投资，特别是审计最有可能增加对预防的投资。当中小企业的宣传也以预防为重点时，他们就重点关注投资者。总体而言，我们通过探索 ECF 新背景下的保证影响来为文献做出贡献，揭示投资者决策中以前未探索的方面。