Short-termism in investment decisions often results in poor firm performance, though excessively long investments can also harm performance by reducing internal flexibility. This study investigated a quadratic, inverted U-shaped relationship between investment horizon and performance. Building on agency theory and resource-constraint arguments, we proposed that organizational slack moderates the relationship between investment horizon and firm performance. For short investment horizons, slack represented unused resources that could have been invested, thus leading to lower performance. For long investment horizons, slack helped cover unanticipated expenses and increased firm performance. We found empirical support for our theory in a large sample of privately held European firms in the utilities and retail trade industries.

中文翻译：

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投资期限、闲置资源和公司绩效：来自欧洲私营公司的证据


投资决策中的短期主义往往会导致公司业绩不佳，但长期投资也会因降低内部灵活性而损害业绩。本研究调查了投资期限和业绩之间的二次倒U形关系。基于代理理论和资源约束论点，我们提出组织冗余调节投资期限和公司绩效之间的关系。对于短期投资期限，闲置代表着本可以投资的未使用资源，从而导致绩效较低。对于长期投资而言，闲置时间有助于支付意外费用并提高公司业绩。我们在公用事业和零售贸易行业的大量欧洲私营公司样本中发现了对我们理论的实证支持。