This paper examines the effect of industry tournament incentives on acquisition performance. Using the pay gap between a firm's CEO and the highest-paid CEO in the same industry as the measure of industry tournament incentives, we find that deals led by CEOs with higher industry tournament incentives experience higher abnormal announcement returns. This positive relation between industry tournament incentives and acquisition returns is more pronounced when CEOs have greater mobility and probability of winning the tournament prize. Our findings highlight those tournament incentives induced by the external labor market play important roles in corporate acquisitions.

中文翻译：

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行业锦标赛激励和收购绩效


本文研究了行业锦标赛激励对收购绩效的影响。用公司CEO与同行业中薪酬最高CEO之间的薪酬差距作为行业锦标赛激励的衡量标准，我们发现，行业锦标赛激励较高的CEO主导的交易会获得更高的异常公告回报。当首席执行官具有更大的流动性和赢得锦标赛奖金的可能性时，行业锦标赛激励和收购回报之间的这种正相关关系更加明显。我们的研究结果强调了外部劳动力市场引发的锦标赛激励在企业收购中发挥着重要作用。