We estimate a structural model of borrowing and lending in the illegal money lending market using a unique panel survey of 1,090 borrowers taking out 11,032 loans from loan sharks. We use the model to evaluate the effects of interventions aimed at limiting this market. We find that an enforcement crackdown that occurred during our sample period increased lenders’ unit cost of harassment and interest rates, while lowering volume of loans, lender profits and borrower welfare. Policies removing borrowers in the middle of the repayment ability distribution, reducing gambling or reducing time discounting are also effective at lowering lender profitability.

中文翻译：

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限制非法放贷的政策干预的效果


我们通过对 1,090 名借款人从高利贷者那里获得 11,032 笔贷款进行的独特小组调查，估计了非法放贷市场的借贷结构模型。我们使用该模型来评估旨在限制该市场的干预措施的效果。我们发现，在我们的样本期内发生的执法打击增加了贷方的单位骚扰成本和利率，同时降低了贷款量、贷方利润和借款人福利。在还款能力分配中间剔除借款人、减少赌博或减少时间折扣的政策也能有效降低贷款人的盈利能力。