Does the stock market exert short-term pressure on listed firms, do they respond, and is this response value reducing? We show that limited investor horizons indeed have those consequences, as follows. First, informative stock prices increase firm value; in our model, they reduce the agency cost of incentivizing managers. Second, short project maturity improves stock price informativeness by catering to informed investors with short horizons. Third, since informed trading capital is a scarce resource, attracting informed investors cannot increase an individual firm’s price informativeness in equilibrium: it simply destroys shareholder value. This “short-termism trap” can potentially destroy up to 100% of the benefits of stock market listing.

中文翻译：

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短期主义陷阱：迎合视野有限的知情投资者


股市是否对上市公司施加短期压力？上市公司是否做出反应？这种反应值是否在减少？我们证明，投资者视野有限确实会产生如下后果。首先，信息丰富的股票价格增加了公司价值；在我们的模型中，它们降低了激励管理者的代理成本。其次，较短的项目成熟度通过迎合目光短浅的知情投资者来提高股票价格的信息性。第三，由于知情交易资本是一种稀缺资源，吸引知情投资者并不能增加单个公司的均衡价格信息量：它只会破坏股东价值。这种“短期主义陷阱”可能会破坏股市上市100%的好处。